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ABSTRACT

The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the number, frequency, and scope of
cyberattacks, both in the United States and abroad. This upward trend necessitates that a
significant aspect of any organization’s information systems strategy involves having a strong
cybersecurity profile. Inherent in such a posture is the need to have IT managers who are experts
in their field and who are willing and able to employ best practices and educate their users.
Furthermore, IT managers need to have awareness of the technology landscape in and around
their organizations. After many years of cybersecurity research, large corporations have come to
implicitly understand these factors and, as such, have invested heavily in both technology and
specialized personnel with the express aim of increasing their cybersecurity capabilities.
However, large institutions are comprised of smaller organizational units, which are not always
adequately considered when examining the cybersecurity profile of the organization. This
oversight is particularly true of colleges and universities where IT managers who are not
affiliated with the institution’s central IT department employ their own information security
strategies. Such strategies may or may not represent a threat to the institution’s overall level of
cybersecurity readiness. Therefore, this research examines the responses of workgroup IT
managers who are employed at the school or department level at institutions of higher learning
within the United States to determine their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness. The
conceptual model that is developed in this study is referred to as the Practice and Awareness
Cybersecurity Readiness Model (PACRM). It examines the relationships between an IT
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manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack, and four base
factors. Among the factors studied are the manager’s previous level of experience in
cybersecurity, the extent of the manager’s use of best practices, the manager’s awareness of the
network infrastructure in and around the organizational unit, and the degree to which the
manager’s supported user community is educated on topics related to information security. First,
a survey instrument is proposed and validated. Then, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is
conducted to examine the relationships between the observed variables and the underlying
theoretical constructs. Finally, the model is tested using path analysis. The validated instrument
will have obvious implications for both cybersecurity researchers and managers. Not only will it
be available to other researchers, it will also provide a metric by which practitioners can gauge
their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness. In addition, if the underlying model is found
to have been correctly specified, it will provide a theoretical foundation on which to base future
research that is not dependent on threats and deterrents but rather on raising the self-efficacy of
the human resource.
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1.1

INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity Today
We are now treated to almost daily accounts of some new cyber or ransom ware attack.

Each intrusion that we read about in the morning paper, such as the recent cyberattack against
Equifax, endangers the personal information of hundreds of millions of individuals (Bernard, et
al., 2017). In some cases, the ability of life-saving institutions to function at full capacity is
threatened, thereby endangering human lives (Barts Health NHS Trust, 2017). Due to the
enormity and rapid deployment of today’s cyber and ransom ware attacks, it can be difficult to
come to terms with what, if anything, can be done to stop the seemingly endless tide of such
events.
In addition to the Equifax data breach, a major recent event was the global ransomware
known as the WannaCry virus, which swept across the globe in a matter of hours paralyzing
computers in approximately 150 countries (Sanger, Chan, & Scott, 2017). Other recent
cyberattacks, although less publicized than the WannaCry attack, have run the gamut from the
mundane to the bizarre (Perlroth & Haag, 2017; Rosenberg & Salam, 2017). These incidents all
clearly demonstrate that cyber and ransom ware attacks are increasing worldwide in frequency,
scope, and severity. This trend is driven by the relative ease with which hackers can now launch
a world-wide cyber attack; a trend that has been made possible by the confluence of new and
widely-available tools, which have combined to make cyber and ransom ware attacks both easy
and profitable. As Nicole Perlroth notes in her New York Times article entitled, “With New
1

Digital Tools, Even Nonexperts Can Wage Cyberattacks,” the advent of digital currencies
like BitCoin, together with the proliferation and adoption of new and powerful encryption
software, have made it increasingly easy for would-be thieves to wage cyber and ransom ware
warfare. Perlroth notes, for example, that the WannaCry attack, which started in Europe on the
afternoon of May 12, 2017, was an escalation of recent previous episodes, which exploited the
same Microsoft Windows vulnerability that was first discovered by the National Security
Agency (N.S.A.) of the United States. The exploit became available to hackers in April, 2017
when a group called the “Shadow Brokers” targeted the N.S.A. and made away with several of
the agency’s own hacking tools. One of those tools, code-named EternalBlue, formed the basis
for the WannaCry ransom ware. Microsoft Windows is the operating system of choice for
approximately 80% of the world’s desktop computers. Even though Microsoft had been warned
by the N.S.A. prior to May, 2017 that the exploit had been exposed and was available to hackers,
and Microsoft had in turn released a security patch to close the exploit, enough computers were
left exposed that the WannaCry ransom ware was able to encrypt the computers of more than
70,000 organizations before it was stopped (Perlroth, 2017b). Perlroth further notes that several
of the Bitcoin accounts associated with the ransom ware received the equivalent of $33,000
American dollars by May 13, 2017 for an attack, which had begun the previous afternoon. By
the following Monday, the Bitcoin payments totaled just under $60,000 (Lohr & Alderman,
2017).
Fortunately, cybersecurity specialists are as qualified and motivated as hackers are. Take,
for example, the story of the young cybersecurity expert who worked from his bedroom flat in
England to stem the tide of the WannaCry attack. Marcus Hutchins, a 22-year old English tech
worker who works for the Los Angeles-based security firm Kryptos Logic, was analyzing a
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sample of the malicious code that made up the WannaCry virus when he noticed that the code
referenced an unregistered web domain. He promptly registered the domain, which helped to
slow the spread of the attack. The CEO of Kryptos Logic, Salim Neino, credits Hutchins with
slowing the virus on Friday afternoon European time before it could infect computers in the
United States. Neino was effusive in his praise of Hutchins’ work, stating that, “Marcus, with
the program he runs at Krypto Logic, not only saved the United States but also prevented further
damage to the rest of the world” (The Associated Press, 2017). Later, a kill switch was created
by Matthieu Suiche, another cyber security researcher, to stop the virus (Perlroth, Scott, &
Frenkel, 2017). Hutchins and Suiche are part of a global network of security specialists who
watch for cyber threats to emerge and work to thwart them. Those specialists are part of a global
industry that, it is estimated, will spend over $120 billion in 2017, up from just $3.5 billion in
2004. That growth is projected to continue at twelve to fifteen percent annually for the next five
years (The Associated Press, 2017). Such resources will be increasingly important, since the
WannaCry ransom ware attack by no means represents the zenith of the worldwide cyber and
ransom ware threat.
Indeed, many cybersecurity specialists believe that we are already seeing the next evolution
of attacks based on the tools that were stolen from the N.S.A. On April 29, 2017, a cyberattack
hit the IDT corporation. That company’s global chief information officer is a cyber security
specialist by the name of Golan Ben-Oni. That attack presented itself as a ransom ware attack.
However, further analysis indicated that the ransom ware was simply a mask to cover the
deployment of a second tool, which had also been stolen from the N.S.A. earlier in the month.
The tool, which is code-named DoublePulsar, allows hackers to insert malicious code into the
kernel of a computer’s operating system, effectively bypassing many standard cyber security
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measures. In the intervening months since the attack, Mr. Ben-Oni stated that he has spoken
with over a hundred security experts in all facets of the industry, including chief executives of
nearly every major security company as well as the heads of intelligence at Google, Microsoft,
and Amazon. Of those firms, only Amazon had found traces of a residual probing effort by the
same computer that hit IDT. DoublePulsar represents a new and pervasive level of cyber threat.
Sean Dillon, an analyst at RiskSense, a New Mexico-based cyber security firm, tested all major
antivirus products against the DoublePulsar hack and found that 99% of the them failed to detect
it (Perlroth, 2017a).
A second large-scale cyberattack hit the Ukraine on June 27, 2017 and immediately spread
internationally. It used the same Microsoft Windows exploit, EternalBlue, that the WannaCry
ransom ware attack used. The more recent attack, however, was more encompassing in that it
worked by encrypting the entire hard drive of the computer, whereas the WannaCry virus
targeted only individual files and directories. The attack crippled ATM machines in Kiev and
radiation monitoring stations at Chernobyl where workers were forced to monitor radiation levels
manually. In the United States, hospitals in two cities in Pennsylvania were forced to
temporarily shut down operations after the attack affected computers at Heritage Valley Health
Systems, a Pennsylvania health care provider. The attack spread through both the Microsoft
Windows exploit and through stealing users’ credentials in much the same way as the attack on
IDT did. This means that even computers that had the latest Microsoft patch might have been
vulnerable to infection. In this way, the attack shared many similarities with a virus that
emerged last year called Petya. Petya, which translates to “Little Peter” in Russian, was
available for sale on the “Dark Web” where it was sold as “ransom ware as a service,” a play on
Silicon Valley’s business model of software-as-a-service (SaaS). This made it difficult to trace
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the individuals responsible for the attack. It is relatively easy, for example, for purchasers of the
service to encrypt victims’ computers and demand a ransom, which the creators of the original
Petya virus then receive a portion of (Perlroth, Scott, & Frenkel, 2017).
1.2

Cybersecurity: History and Definitions
The first known usage of the term cybersecurity was in 1989. It is simply defined as, “any

measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized access or attack”
(Merriam-Webster, 2017). Information security, or computer security, however, describes a
concept that emerged with the development of the first mainframe computers in the 1960s. In
June 1967, researchers at the Department of Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency
(ARPA) began meeting regularly to discuss security of classified information. The group was
made official in October 1967 and was immediately tasked with formulating recommendations
(Whitman & Mattord, 2016). Those recommendations formed the basis for the Rand Report R609, which was later declassified in 1979 under the title Rand Report R-609-1. Rand Report R609-1 became the first widely accepted document to identify management and policy issues
surrounding information and computer security (Ware, 1979).
Research into the subject of computer security continued throughout the 1970s. However,
with the migration of computers out of the controlled and physically isolated mainframe
environments and into the organization, research into computer security took on a new urgency.
As such, there was a movement during the latter half of the 1980s to redefine what information
security meant (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987). A slightly more comprehensive definition,
therefore, may be found in a 1988 treatise on building a secure computer system. The author
states that information security is, “the protection of computer systems against the theft or
damage to their hardware, software, or information, as well as from disruption or misdirection of
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the services they provide” (Gasser, 1988). Information security, within this context, involves
controlling access to the physical hardware of the computer as well as protecting against threats
that may originate from outside the physical infrastructure; through the manipulation of network
access, for instance.
1.3

Problem Statement
According to a recent survey of Chief Information Officers (CIOs), organizational

information security is at the forefront of their management concerns (Grant Thornton, 2016).
Despite this fact, however, and despite a spate of security management research that focuses on
commercial organizations, there seems to be a relative absence of applicable research as it
pertains to complex, multi-tiered organizations such as colleges and universities. Studies that
specifically examine the link between cybersecurity and higher education seem to be limited to
just a few, which took place primarily in the decade between 2000 and 2010. (Elliott et al., 1991;
Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Tout et al., 2009; Oblinger & Hawkins, 2006). This lack of recent
inquiry persists despite evidence that institutions of higher learning are experiencing
cyberattacks with increased frequency (Rezgui & Marks, 2008).
Research into the cybersecurity readiness of colleges and universities is complicated by the
distributed nature of IT administration at such institutions. While much of the responsibility for
the management of an institution falls under the purview of the central IT department, numerous
responsibilities still reside within individual schools and departments. The men and women who
shoulder these responsibilities often work outside of the central department. As such, it follows
that they neither share in the department’s resources nor in its organizational hierarchy. The
actions of such school and department level managers may represent an uncontrolled variable in
the organization’s cybersecurity profile, which in turn presents a potential avenue of exploitation
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for individuals who are intent on gaining unauthorized access to that institution’s information
resources. For these and other reasons, institutions of higher learning, especially at the school or
department level, are an important, but neglected, area of inquiry in terms of information security
research. Since decentralized IT administration is a trait that is common to many complex,
multi-tiered organizations, a comprehensive evaluation of the factors most associated with
cybersecurity readiness at this level is needed. It is the view of this project that such an
evaluation should take place within the context of colleges and universities to address the relative
paucity of research pertaining to that domain. This study therefore attempts to fill that void by
examining the behavior and perceptions of workgroup IT managers who work at the school and
department level of colleges and universities in the United States.
1.4

Research Questions
We begin by asking the following research question:
RQ1: What factors are associated with the perceived readiness of workgroup IT
managers to detect, prevent, and if necessary, recover from a cyberattack?
By answering RQ1, this project hopes to more thoroughly address the topic of

cybersecurity readiness in complex, multi-tiered organizations. From a comprehensive review of
the relevant information security research, it was hypothesized that four distinct groups of factors
help to inform an IT manager’s perceived cybersecurity readiness. These four factors are: the
manager’s previous level of experience with cybersecurity, the extent of his or her use of known
best practices, his or her perceived awareness of several factors related to the network and
computer infrastructure, and the degree to which the user community that he or she supports is
educated about issues related to information security. Therefore, a subset of research questions
related to RQ1 is:
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RQ1a: How is an IT manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience related to his
or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack?
RQ1b: How is the extent of an IT manager’s use of cybersecurity best practices related to
his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack?
RQ1c: How is an IT manager’s awareness of the network environment in and around the
organizational unit related to his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and
recover from a cyberattack?
RQ1d: How is the degree to which the user community is educated about issues
pertaining to information security related to the IT manager’s perceived readiness
to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack?
Finally, a manager’s attitude toward risk should be also be considered when evaluating
the extent of his or her use of best practices. Therefore,
RQ2: Does attitude towards risk affect the relationship between an IT manager’s
previous level of experience and the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best
practices?
To answer these research questions, the following theoretical model was developed. It will
be described and validated throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
1.5

PACRM Theoretical Model
This project develops and evaluates a model, which links the four factors listed above with

the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack. The
model is illustrated below in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: PACRM Conceptual Model Diagram

Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity is a summative measure, which is
composed of three distinct variables. The first variable is the amount of time that the manager
has spent engaged in cyberattack detection and prevention training. This variable is combined
with the manager’s self-reported levels of experience with stopping and initiating cyberattacks.
This factor is thought to be related to the Extent of Use factors, which capture the manager’s use
of network activity monitoring mechanisms, the extent of control over physical access to
computer and network resources, the use of software preventative measures, and the use of a
backup policy where backups are kept offline. Next, the Perceived Awareness factors capture
the manager’s knowledge and awareness of the immediate threat environment, the perceived
vulnerabilities in the physical network infrastructure, and the defensive measures currently in
place to protect against intrusion. Third, the Degree of User Community Awareness of Security
9

Issues factor represents the IT manager’s perception of the degree to which the user community
that he or she supports is educated about issues related to information security. Finally, the
manager’s attitude towards risk, as denoted by a risk avoidance measure, moderates the
relationship between his or her previous level of experience with cybersecurity and the extent of
his or her use of best practices.
1.6

Review of Methodology
To test the PACRM theoretical model in Figure 1, it is first necessary to develop a survey

instrument that can be administered to the appropriate managers. Since the instrument is new, it
must first undergo a process of instrument validation. The final survey instrument is included as
Appendix C of this document.
The validation of the PACRM measurement instrument will be conducted in three stages.
Stages 1 and 2 comprise the pilot test phase while stage 3 represents the roll-out phase. Stage 1
will consist of qualitative interviews with several IT managers at a large, public university in the
southeastern United States. Researcher notes of each of the interviews will be collected and the
answers correlated to establish relevant content validity. The interviewees will then be
administered the PACRM survey on paper and encouraged to “think aloud” as they record their
answers. This is an effort to begin establishing the construct validity of the proposed instrument
by noting which questions pose a difficulty for the participants.
Stage 2 will consist of the revised survey being administered as a web-based, Qualtrics study
to IT managers working at colleges and universities throughout the southeastern United States.
The resulting data will be analyzed, and Cronbach’s alpha statistics will be generated to test the
reliability of the proposed instrument.
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Finally, stage 3 will comprise the roll-out phase of the instrument to workgroup IT managers
working at institutions of higher learning throughout the United States. Once enough responses
are generated, a CFA will be done to see how closely the survey aligns with the theoretical
assumptions of the underlying PACRM model. Lastly, the proposed relationships in the model
will be tested using a path analysis framework.
1.7

Chapter Overview
Chapter one provided a brief overview of the state of cybersecurity today. It identified a

problem in the current cybersecurity literature. Namely, even though past and contemporary
studies have affirmed the primacy of cybersecurity among the concerns of top organizational
managers, the extant information security literature has not dealt extensively with organizationalunit level analyses, such as are needed for institutions of higher learning. Therefore, this
dissertation argues that a new model is needed that can be applied equally as well to any
institution that exhibits a decentralized IT organizational structure. Chapter 1, therefore,
introduced and briefly described the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model
(PACRM), which will be discussed and validated through the remainder of this project.
Chapter two goes through a review of the scholastic literature pertaining to organizational
cybersecurity. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers began to look at the issue
of organizational computer security in earnest. Inquiry into the domain of computer security
began with several surveys noting areas of concern among organizational managers. These
surveys initially ranked computer security high among managers’ concerns. However, as the
end-user computing revolution moved computing resources out of the mainframe environment
and into the micro-computer and networking environments, managers struggled with how to
conceptualize information security, and the issue moved down their list of concerns. Beginning
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in the early 1990s, several researchers took up the mantle of researching organizational security.
Over the course of this research, several informative conceptual models were developed and
tested. Goodhue and Straub (1991) developed a theory and empirical-based model, which
looked at managers’ perceptions as a function of industry risk, the extent of organizational effort
to control those risks, and individual factors such as awareness of previous system violations,
and security background. That model has many elements in common with the PACRM model
being proposed in the present research. Later research began to look at information security as a
function of manager behavior. Specifically, research that was based on the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB) played a significant role in identifying factors that could shape IT managers’
information security intentions. Chapter two concludes by describing the theoretical and
empirical foundations of the variables in the PACRM model, which has determinants, like
models before it, in General Deterrence Theory (GDT). However, GDT-based research, which
can end up relying heavily on technologically-driven solutions to ensure both the certainty and
severity of sanctions, has been shown to be inadequate in some cases (Cavusoglu, Son, &
Benbasat, 2009; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). Therefore, Self-Efficacy Theory (SET) is used, in
conjunction with general deterrence theory, to inform the remainder of the components of the
PACRM model.
Chapter three describes the proposed relationships between the independent factors and the
dependent factors of the PACRM model. Those relationships are then articulated in the form of
propositions.
Chapter four discusses the proposed survey instrument in detail. The stages of instrument
validation are discussed, and a survey methodology is articulated. As described above, in the
pilot testing phase, the survey will first be administered to several IT managers who work at the
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school or department level of several colleges and universities located in the United States. The
initial stage consists of qualitative interviews with several IT administrators who work at a large
university in the southeastern United States. These administrators ranged in years of
professional IT work experience from 5 to 39 years. The results of those interviews resulted in
the inclusion of a new factor into the original model, and a new block of questions on the survey
instrument. In stage two of the pilot study, the survey was administered as a web-based,
Qualtrics survey to several college and university IT administrators. Reliability statistics were
generated and analyzed. Stage three consisted of a national survey of IT administrators drawn
from the collegiate and university workgroup IT manager population. Confirmatory factor
analysis was used to determine the extent to which the survey instrument matched expectations
generated from the underlying model. Once the CFA analysis is complete, the data from stage 3
was used to conduct a path analysis to determine whether the conceptual model adequately
describes managers’ perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In a recent survey of 210 security professionals by a leading security platform provider, it
was found that, on average, ten percent of security personnel admitted to having paid a ransom or
having hid a security breach from their associates or supervisors to protect their jobs (Bromium,
2017). This research is in line with previous studies, which found that insiders, a term that has
been used to describe employees who are authorized to use organizational systems, facilities, or
computer resources, may pose a risk to those organizations’ computer security (Neumann, 1999;
Warkentin & Willison, 2009). In addition, previous studies have found that deliberate acts, such
as those described above, can significantly impact information security (Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et
al., 2004).
2.1

The Rising Importance of Information Security
Research studies that documented threats to computer systems began in earnest as early

as the mid-1970s and have continued through the present day (Parker, 1976, 1981, 1983; Loch,
Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; Whitman, 2004). Early high profile studies and reports primarily
documented threats against the U.S. government (Colton et al., 1982; Kusserow, 1983).
However, it did not take long for researchers and executives to recognize the significance of
information security to businesses. In the mid-1980s, researchers working out of the University
of Minnesota began exploring the issues of greatest concern to information systems executives
and corporate managers (Dickson, et al., 1984; Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987). They found that
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strategic planning and using computers for competitive advantage were at the forefront of
executives’ minds. Organizational learning and IS’s role and contribution to the organization
were also among their concerns, foreshadowing the increasing importance of End-User
Computing (EUC) to organizations. The rising importance of information security, however, can
be seen in such studies by the relative value that executives placed on data as a corporate
resource (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987).
The Brancheau and Wetherbe (1987) study is particularly interesting both in terms of its
survey method and its results. Previous studies (Ball & Harris, 1982; Hartog & Herbert, 1986)
had found that information security ranked much higher among the member populations they
studied. The relative discrepancy in rankings between the studies is likely an artifact of the
survey methods the researchers used and the populations they studied. For instance, in their
survey, Hartog & Herbert employed a single-round cross-sectional approach while Brancheau
and Wetherbe used a three-round Delphi study. It is important to note that the issue of computer
security would come to much rank higher in subsequent studies of the kind (Brancheau, Janz &
Wetherbe, 1996; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009). Brancheau & Weatherbe acknowledge this
possibility in 1987 when they remark in their closing statements that, “While it is useful to make
a periodic assessment of what IS professionals feel are the profession’s most critical issues, it is
often the less obvious problems that become major concerns.”
2.2

General Deterrence Theory-based Research
The veracity of that statement was already beginning to assert itself within just a few

short years. Detmar Straub, a researcher who was also working out of the University of
Minnesota at the time, began to argue for the importance of information security as early as
1990. Based on research he had done previously (Hoffer & Straub, 1989; Straub & Hoffer,
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1987), it was apparent to Straub that organizations were not giving the issue of information
security the requisite attention he felt it deserved, despite the stated importance of data as a
corporate resource. In response, Straub undertook research that looked at information security
from the perspective of General Deterrence Theory (GDT) (Straub D. W., 1990). His research
indicated that investment in IS research could significantly reduce incidents of computer abuse
by advocating for the use of countermeasures, which included administrative policies aimed at
deterrence. Straub’s data also showed that data security activities, which he defined as electronic
security measures, were integral to decreasing the number of incidences of computer abuse
within the organizations that he surveyed.
The applicability of security countermeasures for reducing incidents of computer abuse
had been studied in the Information Systems literature prior to Straub’s research (Madnick,
1978). However, Straub’s aim was to not only to determine if IS deterrence was effective in
reducing incidences of computer abuse, but also to determine if rival explanations, such as the
use of security software, could explain lower incident rates of computer abuse (Straub D. W.,
1990). In order to do so, he defined computer abuse in the traditional vein (Kling, 1980) as
abuse perpetuated by individuals against organizations. Straub articulated that abuse could occur
in this context as hardware abuse, software abuse, data abuse, and computer service abuse
(1990). These four aspects of information security would later form the basis for many
cybersecurity related protocols and frameworks such as COBIT 5, ISA 62443-2-1:2009,
ISO/IEC 27001:2013, and NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4 (NIST, 2014). In addition, Straub’s research
represents one of the first empirical studies to validate the effectiveness of security software in
preventing incidents of computer abuse.
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Later that same year, Straub and another researcher co-authored a study, which addressed
the way in which IS security managers uncovered incidences of computer abuse and disciplined
computer abusers (Straub & Nance, 1990). The authors’ goal for the project was to develop a
way of assessing the risks that organizations face as well as the measures being taken by
organizations to detect computer abuse and discipline abusers. A by-product of this research was
to identify information security managers’ contemporary responses to computer abuse and to
determine factors that could help those managers reduce incidents of computer crime.
Previous research (Straub, 1986) had found that two classes of counter measures –
deterrents and preventatives – were shown to be successful in reducing incidents of computer
abuse. Deterrents, as defined by the author, passively restrict the use of computer resources and
include actions such as computer security training sessions and policy statements. Preventatives,
on the other hand, are those actions that actively restrict the use of computer resources. These
may include things like physical barriers to locations where sensitive data or computer resources
are kept and software solutions such as firewalls and passwords. Detection is another important
component of deterrence. Parker (1981) defined detection as the intentional investigation of
system activity in order to identify irregularities. The principle would later find application in
Dorothy E. Denning’s work on Intrusion Detection Systems (1987). Straub and Nance found
that incidents of computer abuse were discovered in three general ways; through accidental
discovery, normal system controls, and purposeful investigation. The incidents that were
identified from their survey were overwhelmingly discovered by accident, or through normal
system controls (1990). Sadly, detection of extant threats through purposeful investigation
remains the most challenging aspect of cybersecurity to this day.
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Goodhue & Straub (1991) looked at ways in which managers could develop a sense for
the proper balance between exposing their department to unnecessary risk and the cost associated
with preventative measures. The authors argued that managerial concern over organizational
security is a function of the risk that is inherent in the industry, the extent to which the
organization has controlled for these risks, and the factors that are associated with the individual
managers, such as their awareness of previous systems violations and their level of experience in
performing systems control work. Goodhue and Straub’s model is shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Managerial Perceptions of Security Risk (Goodhue & Straub, 1991)

Several elements from Goodhue’s and Straub’s model have correlations in the PACRM
model being proposed herein. The second and third components, “IS Environment” and
“Individual Characteristics,” in particular, are both related to elements of the proposed model
that is described below in Chapter 3. As stated by Goodhue and Straub, the “IS Environment”
construct reflects managers’ current understanding of the type of technical and managerial
controls that can be used to secure information systems. The “Individual Characteristics”
component, meanwhile, describes how well informed managers are about the number and types
of local security incidents and the susceptibility of their systems to damage (Goodhue & Straub,
1991). As their research showed, both factors are informative in determining managers’ concern
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about systems risk. In fact, independent corroboration of Goodhue & Straub’s proposed
relationships was reported shortly after the paper was originally published (Dixon, Marston, &
Collier, 1992). However, both constructs were designed to be very high level in how they
assessed individual managers’ awareness/knowledge. Neither factor addressed specific areas of
concern to IT managers. In addition, Goodhue & Straub’s research was designed to measure
manager perceptions at the executive level. As such, their model has the implicit assumption
that managerial concerns about IS security are only relevant at the institutional level. Such
research is unquestionably valid. However, as stated in the introduction, the present research
addresses the perceptions of IT managers at the decentralized level of administration. This is
important because measuring manager perceptions at this lower level of IT administration has
important ramifications for the cybersecurity profile of the institution as a whole.
In 1998, Straub and Richard Welke collaborated to test their Security Action Cycle
(SAC) model using qualitative data that they obtained from two Fortune 500 firms. Previous
research had emphasized four distinct categories related to information security. These
categories were deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery (Forcht, 1984; Parker, 1981).
Straub and Welke’s model looked at a possible method of deterrence feedback, based on a series
of sequential actions that managers could take. These actions ranged from deterrence to
remediation (Straub & Welke, 1998). While informative, the model is primarily concerned with
reinforcing the two central tenets of general deterrence theory, which are the certainty and
severity of punitive actions to deter abusive behavior. However, GDT-based solutions, like the
ones presented above, while arguably the dominant framework for security research throughout
the 1990s, do not represent the sum total of information security research.
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In fact, there have been several recent critiques of GDT-based research. In 2011,
researchers sought to understand the relationship between the punishment of Information
Security Policy (ISP) breaches by insiders and the perceived justice of those punishments (Xue,
Liang, & Wu, 2011). They found that the intention to comply with the organization’s security
policy is strongly related to the perceived justice of punishment, which in turn is negatively
affected by actual punishment. Because punishment serves to enforce the two key tenets of
general deterrence theory, as articulated in Straub’s original article (1990), Xue et al.’s findings
represent a significant repudiation of the effectiveness of GDT-based solutions. Additional
research has examined the role that computer monitoring plays on attributed trust (Posey,
Bennett, & Roberts, 2011). Attributed trust is the insider’s perception that the organization trusts
them. The authors found that low attributed trust drives incidents of computer abuse. Likewise,
it has been found that security related stress (SRS) from security controls may adversely affect
moral engagement among employees and, in turn, lead to increased incidents of computer abuse
(D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014). While GDT-based studies may no longer be at the pinnacle of
insider threat research, they do represent an important foundational step for subsequent research
that looked at these issues (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). However, to
go further, information security research had to evolve beyond simple deterrence to begin to
address individual intention as well.
2.3

Theory of Planned Behavior-based Research
In 2010, researchers from the University of British Columbia continued the examination

of employee behavior regarding information security by also looking at employee compliance
with ISPs. Rather than adopting a GDT perspective, however, they did so from the vantage point
of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991). TPB postulates that an individual’s
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intention to perform various kinds of behaviors can be predicted by his or her attitudes towards
the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, which are all original aspects
of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
TPB further stipulates that behaviors can be explained through behavioral beliefs, normative
beliefs, and self-efficacy, which serve as antecedents to attitudes, subjective norms, and
behavioral control (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).
A good example of information security research that is based on TPB is Bulgurcu et al.’s
article, which postulated that employees’ intention to comply with their organization’s ISP is
influenced by three factors: attitude towards compliance, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy
(2010). In that article, the authors researched the role that the employee’s information security
awareness plays in shaping his or her attitude toward compliance. They postulated that it
influences his or her beliefs over the outcome as well as his or her attitude toward compliance.
In turn, his or her attitude towards compliance informs his or her intention to comply with the
organization’s ISP. Bulgurcu et al.’s model is informative. However, one area of concern with
respect to their model is that “Information Security Awareness” is comprised only of the
manager’s awareness of the organization’s ISP and the manager’s general security awareness.
As with Goodhue & Straub’s model from Figure 2 above, the constructs are not grounded in
specific areas of concern to IT managers. While it was not the authors’ intention to incorporate
specific areas of awareness, other than ISP awareness, into their model, it is nonetheless an area
that this dissertation seeks to address.
In 2009, Dinev et al. (2009) also looked at user behavior and attitudes towards protective
information technologies from a TPB perspective. They posited that cultural differences
moderate the strength of the relationship in the traditional behavioral model within the context of
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these technologies. Specifically, they found a moderating effect when they examined data from
two divergent cultures, the United States and South Korea. The authors argue that their findings
indicate that cultural differences need to be taken into account when designing certain classes of
protective technologies such as spyware-detection software.
2.4

Research with other Theoretical Orientations
Boss & Kirsch (2007) looked at ways to motivate employees to follow corporate security

guidelines by adopting an organizational lens approach. In their paper, the authors introduce the
concept of “mandatoriness,” which they define as the degree to which employees perceive that
compliance with the organization’s information security guideliness is expected, or mandatory.
They found that through the specification of policies and evaluation of employee behavior, firms
can be effective in convincing their employees that security policies are mandatory, and that
compliance, therefore, is compulsory. In turn, the perception of mandatoriness among
employees is effective in motivating them to adopt security practices. Although presented as a
novel concept, “mandatoriness” has much in common with the theoretical assumptions of GDTbased perspectives. Additional research has argued that employees’ moral reasoning and values
affects their compliance with their organizations’ information security policy (Myyry et al.,
2009). The authors’ theory is based on two existing theories of moral reasoning: The Theory of
Cognitive Moral Development and the Theory of Motivational Types of Values (Kohlberg,
1984; Schwartz, 2007).
Meanwhile, some information security research has focused on whether information
security awareness actually impacts information security. For instance, Siponen (2000) finds
that the accepted notion of information security awareness, as a descriptive construct, is not
sufficient for explaining factual, i.e. normative, aspects of information security. He further
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argues that motivation, as a recognized precursor for action, is not sufficiently considered in
terms of information security. In order to reconcile this problem, Siponen states that all user
behavior that is thought to have an impact upon information security should satisfy the
requirements of behavioral theories and provide answers to end-users about why they should
consider information security in their daily actions. Using this criteria, Siponen further states
that arguments based on morals and ethics, such as those cited above, should be discarded.
In 1992, researchers looked at twelve specific threats and identified their relative
rankings in a survey of MIS executives in terms of three distinct computing environments;
microcomputer, mainframe, and networking (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). They found that
threats to organizations’ information security could arise from inside the organization as well as
from outside the organization. This marked another milestone in the cognitive shift from
thinking of information security in terms of just physical security, where only a few
administrators had access to isolated mainframe computers, to data security where it is necessary
for IT administrators to safeguard networked information assets. As evidence of this shift the
researchers noted that computer viruses posed a growing threat to information security and, as
such, included it in their survey. The concept of the computer virus had previously been
described by J.A. Schweitzer (1989) and Davis and Gantenbein (1987). By the early 1990s, the
concept of the computer virus was already beginning to gain recognition in the information
systems literature as a viable information security threat.
Loch, Carr & Warkentin’s results indicated that a greater percentage of the respondents
surveyed perceived the risk of computer disruption to be higher in the microcomputer
environment (56%), as compared to the mainframe environment, where 62% of the respondents
classified the risk of computer disruption to be low (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). Computer
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viruses were ranked as the fourth most important threat in the network environment and sixth
overall in the microcomputer environment. An interesting ancillary finding of this study, which
has significant implications for the present research, was that the “Education and Training”
industry together with “Information Services” and “Manufacturing” comprised 68% of the
reported verified incidences of computer viruses. Of those three categories, by far the largest
was the “Education and Training” industry, accounting for 60% of verified incidents of a
computer virus (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992).
2.5

Information Security Research in Higher Education Environments
It was not until much later, however, that scholarly articles began to explore information

security within the context of institutions of higher learning. One article to do so explored
information security readiness in higher education from the vantage point of a state-sponsored
university in a developing country (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). The authors of that article adopted a
case study approach to identify the political, social, and cultural factors that adversely affected
information security awareness at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates. While many of
the authors’ conclusions are not applicable to a domestic view of institutions of higher learning
because of strong cultural and organizational differences, it is a premise of this dissertation that
the lack of transparency between departments, as well as complacency in monitoring behaviors,
which Rezgui and Marks identify in their research, are also present in institutions of higher
learning located in the United States. In support of this observation, an EDUCAUSE study
(Updegrove & Wishon, 2003) highlighted an apparent cybersecurity readiness gap in 435 higher
education institutions surveyed. This gap was made apparent by yet another article, which
asserted that a third of higher education institutions experienced a data loss or theft during 2006,
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with nine percent of those reporting a loss or theft of confidential student information (Piazza,
2006).
Cybersecurity incidents at the University of Maryland and at the North Dakota University
system in 2014 underscore the fact that universities are not immune to cyberattack. The first
incident, involving one of the University of Maryland’s primary databases, resulted in the
unauthorized exposure of more than 390,000 student and staff records. The North Dakota
University system experienced a similar data breach in which over 290 student and staff records
were compromised (Ponemon Institute, L.L.C., 2014). Such data breaches occurred even
though, according to the Updegrove and Wishon article, 92% of institutions they surveyed
indicated that they had an institutional ISP in place at the time of the attack. A far more
troubling insight from that article is that a bare majority of respondents indicated using known
best practices. For instance, only 57% of the respondents in their survey reported having a
password change policy that was ninety days or less. A relative minority, 39%, of the schools
surveyed, indicated the presence of an IS awareness program in their institutions and only 30%
reported using risk assessment and audit procedures (Updegrove & Wishon, 2003).
Clearly, more can be done at the institutional level to safeguard the information resources
of colleges and universities. The situation is further complicated by the decentralized levels of
IT administration at institutions of higher learning, which due to limited budgets and limited
staff, may not be as prepared in terms of cybersecurity readiness as centralized, institution-wide
IT departments. The question remains then, how does the cybersecurity readiness picture at the
decentralized department level in complex, multi-tiered organizations such as colleges and
universities look? Furthermore, what can be done at the organizational-unit level of such
institutions to safeguard valuable information resources?
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2.6

Defense in Depth Strategy
A potential answer to the questions listed above appears in an article from the

September/October 2000 issue of IEEE Software. The authors of that article argue that in
addition to normal preventative measures such as formulating a security policy, creating user
authentication and access control lists, creating strong password requirements, and eliminating
unnecessary services, individual network administrators should introduce an intrusion detection
component into their network schema, as one aspect of what the authors refer to as, “defense in
depth” (McHugh, Christie, & Allen, 2000). Defense in depth consists, in part, of network
sensors outside of the protected network, which allow the administrator to gain a sense for the
general threat level around a system’s periphery, as indicated by probes and attempts that are
detected that otherwise would have been blocked by the firewall. As the authors state, a
defensive posture that employs network sensors on both sides of the firewall allows the
administrator to validate and correctly configure firewall rules.
However, a “Defense in Depth” strategy may be beyond the financial and technical
capabilities of individual departments, which are often forced to operate with limited staff and
small budgets. Furthermore, IT administrators who are employed outside of the institution’s
centralized IT department often have their ability to effect changes like firewall configurations
restricted by official institution policy. Many times, such responsibilities reside solely with the
institution’s centralized IT department. It is the premise of this dissertation, therefore, that a
“Defense in Depth” strategy often is not feasible at the organizational-unit level of IT
administration in complex, multi-tiered organizations. Therefore, a different strategy is needed.
The proposed strategy should not solely rely on technological solutions, such as those that
McHugh et al. propose, since such solutions are costly both in terms of purchasing and
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implementation. Rather, it will be far more effective to leverage existing resources to increase
cybersecurity readiness. One such resource, which many organizational units have, is a human
resource in the form of one or more workgroup IT managers.
To increase the cybersecurity readiness of such administrators, and by extension increase
the cybersecurity readiness of the organizational unit, it is first necessary to get a baseline
measure for the current state of cybersecurity readiness at this level of administration. However,
in the absence of reliable data that shows the type, frequency, and severity of cyberattacks
against specific organizational units, such as departments and schools at institutions of higher
learning, information security researchers must adopt an adequate proxy. An IT manager’s
perception of his or her cybersecurity readiness can serve as an adequate proxy for his or her
actual cybersecurity readiness, in much the same way that an individual’s perceived capability
for managing his or her health outcomes has been shown to correlate strongly with his or her
actual intentions to manage personal health outcomes, as demonstrated by instruments like the
Perceived Health Competence Scale (PHCS) (Smith, Wallston, & Smith, 1995). This view is
substantiated, in large part, because of the theoretical justifications of self-efficacy theory (SET),
as laid out by Albert Bandura in his 1977 treatise, “Self-efficacy: towards a unifying theory of
behavioral change.”
2.7

Previous Experience with Cybersecurity
In their article, McHugh et al. raise the valid point that cyberattacks involve multiple

perspectives (2000). They state that the administrator, whose responsibility it is to safeguard the
information technology resources of the organizational unit, should be concerned with answering
questions such as, who was affected by a cyberattack, why did it happen, what happened, and
when and where did the intrusion occur? The attacker, on the other hand, is concerned with
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questions that revolve around his or her objective and its associated risk. Such questions may
pertain to the nature of the objective, the nature of any vulnerabilities that exist, the amount of
damage the attack is likely to result in, the nature and severity of any consequences that may
result from the action, and the availability and applicability of existing exploit scripts or attack
tools. The ability to conceptualize of a cyberattack from both viewpoints is therefore pertinent to
a broader understanding of perceptions of cybersecurity readiness. As discussed later in Chapter
3, both viewpoints are incorporated into the PACRM model as part of the Level of Previous
Experience with Cybersecurity construct, a summative measure that is comprised of the hours
spent in cyber threat detection and prevention training, and his or her self-reported level of
experience with stopping and initiating cyberattacks.
2.8

Information Security: The Quest for the Dependent Variable
The quest for a dependent variable in information security research is an ongoing process.

In many respects, the process is complicated by the seemingly straightforward nature of
information security. The goal of such research is, after all, to improve information security
within organizations by either preventing cyberattacks or otherwise mitigating their adverse
effects. Information security, therefore, does seem to be the logical choice as a dependent
variable and indeed, many recent research studies have adopted information security as their
response variable of choice (Sapegin, et al., 2017). However, what does information security
entail? Widely accepted notions of information security emphasize that information should be
confidential, available, and authentic (Whitman & Mattord, 2016). Therefore, one possible
definition of information security is the process by which these characteristics of an
organization’s information resources are safeguarded from unauthorized manipulation. To
achieve that goal, however, it is necessary for IT managers to engage in concrete activities
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related to safeguarding the availability, authenticity, and confidentiality of their organization’s
information resources. It is the premise of this dissertation that these activities are predicated on
the IT manager’s ability to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack.
2.9

Security Information and Event Management
Security Event Management (SEM) and Security Information Management (SIM) are two

aspects of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), which relies on real-time
monitoring and correlation of events to gauge security threats. The monitoring of real time data
events through the collection of log data is part of SEM, while the long-term storage and
statistical analysis of log data is an aspect of SIM. Not surprisingly, SIEM consists of data
aggregation from multiple sources including network devices, security sensors, servers, and
databases. SIEM is incorporated into the PACRM model in Chapter 3 as the Extent of the IT
Manager’s Use of Network Monitoring Mechanisms factor.
2.10 Cybersecurity Best Practice Frameworks
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) lists 20 top controls for managers to use in securing
their information systems’ infrastructure (CIS Controls, 2017). Among other items, included in
that list are: Secured configurations for hardware and software, controlled use of administrative
privileges, maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs, malware defenses, data recovery
capabilities, boundary defense, controlled access based on the need to know, account monitoring
and control, and security skills assessment and appropriate training to fill the gaps (CIS Controls,
2017). Each of the controls listed above is represented by elements of the PACRM model,
discussed in Chapter 3.
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Table 1 presents a brief synopsis of the elements associated with the Extent of Use of
Cybersecurity Best Practices and the Degree of User Community Awareness of Security Issues
factors from the PACRM model and their corollaries among the CIS controls.
Table 1: PACRM Elements and their CIS Control Corollaries

CIS Controls Description (Center for
Internet Security, 2017)
Collect, manage, and analyze audit logs of
events that could help detect, understand, or
recover from an attack.
Detect/prevent/correct the flow of
information transferring networks of
different trust levels with a focus on
security-damaging data.
The processes and tools used to
track/control/prevent/correct secure access to
critical assets (e.g., information, resources,
systems) according to the formal
determination of which persons, computers,
and applications have a need and right to
access these critical assets based on an
approved classification.
Actively manage the life cycle of system and
application accounts – their creation, use,
dormancy, deletion – to minimize
opportunities for attackers to leverage them.
Manage the security life cycle of all in-house
developed and acquired software to prevent,
detect, and correct security weaknesses.
The processes and tools used to properly
back up critical information with a proven
methodology for timely recovery of it.
For all functional roles in the organization
(prioritizing those mission-critical to the
business and its security), identify the
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities
needed to support defense of the enterprise;
develop and execute an integrated plan to
assess, identify gaps, and remediate through
policy, organizational planning, training, and
awareness programs.

PACRM Model Element
Use and Routinely Monitor Network
Activity Logs
Employ Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
and/or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)
and sensor deployments and/or traffic
analyzers
Control unauthorized physical access to
network and server resources through
physical means or electronic means such as
locking the BIOS or encryption

Require Strong Passwords and Require
Users to Update Passwords

Run Critical Operating System or
Application Software Updates
Perform Regular System Backups with
Backups that are Stored Offline
Ensure User Community Awareness on
Security Issues
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In addition to the Center for Internet Security guidelines listed above, there is a wide
range of frameworks that provide guidelines for cybersecurity best practices. Three of the most
widely used of these frameworks are the NIST 800-14 (Swanson & Guttman, 1996), the ISO
27000 series (International Standards Organization, 2017), and the NIST 2014 framework for
improving critical cybersecurity infrastructure (NIST, 2014).
While the NIST 800-14 framework identifies many controls related to information
security, Chapter 3 of the NIST standard is particularly relevant because it pertains to IT security
practices. Specifically, the sections that are most pertinent to the present discussion are
personnel/user issues (3.5), computer security incident handling (3.7), awareness and training
(3.8), security considerations in computer support and operations (3.9), and physical and
environmental security (3.10). Each of these chapter sections contain controls that are reflected
in the PACRM model, discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. For example, section 3.7 in
the NIST framework contains controls for an “Educated Constituency,” which is reflected in the
Degree of User Community Awareness of Security Issues factor of the PACRM model.
Likewise, section 3.9 contains controls for software support, which includes controls for periodic
backups and regular application backups. These items are reflected in the PACRM model as the
Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures and Extent of Use of a Backup Policy where
Backups are Kept Offline factors. Since 1996, the NIST 800-14 framework has directed U.S.
federal government efforts in terms of information security.
Conversely, the ISO 27000 series of cybersecurity guidelines are directed towards
improving cybersecurity in organizations all over the world. The ISO 27000 framework is a
series of related guidelines, which IT managers across a wide range of domains and
organizations can use to strengthen and refine their cybersecurity strategies. As such, it was not
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written to be directly applicable to government settings. It does, however, share many controls
in common with frameworks that were. For example, ISO 27002, which was originally
published in October 2005, contains controls for human resources security as well as access
control and operations security. Both controls closely mirror the NIST 800-14 elements listed
above.
Finally, the NIST 2014 framework represents the latest iteration in the evolution of
information and cybersecurity best practices. Each of the core categories in the framework are
aligned with five high-level functions. These functions are: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond
and Recover (NIST, 2014). Three of these five functions are represented as the response
variables of choice in the PACRM model presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Table 2
presents the brief descriptions of the high-level NIST functions, as articulated by the framework.
Table 2: NIST 2014 Framework for Improving Critical Cybersecurity Infrastructure High‐Level Function Descriptions

Description (NIST, 2014)
Develop the organizational understanding to
manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets,
data, and capabilities.
Develop and implement the appropriate
safeguards to ensure delivery of critical
infrastructure services.
Develop and implement the appropriate
activities to identify the occurrence of a
cybersecurity event.
Develop and implement the appropriate
activities to take action regarding a detected
cybersecurity event.
Develop and implement the appropriate
activities to maintain plans for resilience and
to restore any capabilities or services that were
impaired due to a cybersecurity event.

NIST 2014 High-Level Function
Identify
Protect
Detect
Respond
Recover

These descriptions illustrate that, of the five functions enumerated, only four are directly
applicable to the organizational-unit level. The function that does not directly pertain to specific,
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organizational-unit level activities is the Identify function. The Identify function is primarily
concerned with orienting the organization’s policy towards an awareness of information security
issues. As such, it is more suitable to levels of IT administration above that of the individual,
organizational unit, which forms the unit of analysis for the present discussion. The Response
and Protect functions, meanwhile, are closely related. The primary difference between the two
functions is that the Response function is concerned with communications, analysis, and
response management after a cyberattack has occurred. It is unlikely that individual workgroup
IT managers, who work at the decentralized level of IT administration will have a codified
response management plan, complete with mitigation strategies and communication protocols.
This is deemed to be particularly true in institutions of higher learning where the IT personnel of
any one school or department often labor under reduced staff and budgetary considerations. It
may be useful, however, to test this assumption in future iterations of the PACRM model in
larger organizational units where the specific strategies of the response function are more likely
to be utilized.
2.11 Self-Efficacy
Figure 3 is taken from Albert Bandura’s initial paper on self-efficacy. In that paper,
Bandura differentiates between outcome expectations and efficacy expectations in the following
manner. Outcome expectations are those expectations that cause an individual to estimate that a
given set of behaviors will result in a certain outcome. Efficacy expectations, on the other hand,
are the individual’s belief that he or she can successfully execute the set of behaviors required to
produce the desired outcome.
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Figure 3: Diagrammatic representation of the difference between efficacy expectations and outcome expectations (Bandura,
1977).

For instance, an individual may reasonably expect that a certain behavior, or set of
behaviors, will lead to a given outcome based on previous empirical or academic knowledge. At
the same time, however, he or she may be reasonably uncertain as to whether they can enact such
behavior(s). Efficacy expectations affect both an individual’s initial coping behaviors and the
persistence of those coping behaviors in the face of challenges. Given that the appropriate skills
and effective incentives are present, an individual’s efficacy expectations are a strong
determinant of his or her choice of activities, how much effort he or she will expend in the
pursuit of a goal, and how long he or she will sustain effort in the face of challenges towards that
goal (Bandura, 1977).
We might reasonably substitute the components of information security discussed above
into Bandura’s original model, as illustrated below in Figure 4. By doing so, we see that a
workgroup IT manager’s actual ability to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack are
outcome expectations, while his or her perceived readiness to perform those same actions are
efficacy expectations. That is, in Bandura’s original conceptualization, by increasing his or her
abilities with respect to detection, prevention, and recovery of cyberattacks, an IT manager may
reasonably expect to suffer fewer and/or less severe cyberattacks, relative to the ultimate
outcome of such attacks. However, his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and, if
necessary, recover from a cyberattack translates into a belief as to whether he or she can perform
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those behaviors. Since the IT manager at this level of administration is integral to determining
the cybersecurity readiness of the organizational unit, it stands to reason that the organizational
unit likewise benefits from an increase in either the manager’s outcome expectations or in his or
her efficacy expectations.

Figure 4: Self‐efficacy theory (SET) model with information security components

While it is instructive to situate elements of information security within Bandura’s
original framework to show that self-efficacy is germane to the present discussion, this
dissertation is not concerned with merely validating Bandura’s original SET model in a new
context, any more than has already been done. SET has already been applied to the information
and computer domain through previous research, most notably in the form of Computer SelfEfficacy (CSE) (Compeau & Higgins, 1995).
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3
3.1

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Research Questions
The present dissertation is concerned with answering the following questions.
RQ1: What factors are associated with the perceived readiness of workgroup IT
managers to detect, prevent, and if necessary, recover from a cyberattack?
RQ2: Does attitude towards risk affect the relationship between an IT manager’s
previous level of experience and the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best
practices.
To attempt to answer these questions, we start by revisiting Bandura’s original definition

of efficacy expectations. Recall that efficacy expectations are an individual’s belief in his or her
ability to produce a given set of behaviors. In terms of information security management,
efficacy expectations represent the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and
recover from a cyberattack. These perceptions, in turn, affect his or her actual cybersecurity
readiness.
As per Bandura’s original (1977) model, efficacy expectations are informed by four
major sources of information. Among these are performance accomplishments, vicarious
experiences, verbal persuasion, and emotional arousal. Each of these four sources of information
provide feedback to the participant, which helps to strengthen his or her efficacy expectations.
Each of the four sources, in turn, can be supplied through different modes of induction. Figure 5
is from Bandura’s article and helps to illustrate the portion of his model pertaining to efficacy
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expectations. Figure 6 is a repeat of Figure 1 from this dissertation. It illustrates the
PACRM model in its entirety. It has been placed below for the convenience of the reader.

Figure 5: Efficacy Expectations (Bandura, 1977)
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Figure 6: PACRM Conceptual Model Diagram (Repeat of Figure 1)

The PACRM model, shown in Figure 6 above, incorporates several of Bandura’s original
sources that are believed to affect an IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and
recover from a cyberattack. Recall that the four primary factors of the PACRM model are the IT
manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience, the extent of his or her use of
cybersecurity best practices, his or her awareness of the computer and network environment in
and around the organizational unit, and the degree to which the user community that he or she
supports is educated about issues related to information security. Recall, also, that the secondary
research questions that are pertinent to this research are:
RQ1a: How is an IT manager’s previous level of cybersecurity experience related to his
or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.
RQ1b: How is the extent of an IT manager’s use of cybersecurity best practices related to
his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.
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RQ1c: How is an IT manager’s awareness of the computer and network environment in
and around the organizational unit related to his or her perceived readiness to
detect and prevent a cyberattack.
RQ1d: How is the degree to which the user community is educated about issues
pertaining to information security related to the IT manager’s perceived readiness
to detect and prevent a cyberattack.
It can be surmised that the factors related to research question 1c use the modes of
induction related to the emotional arousal source from Figure 5 above. In other words, an IT
manager’s level of awareness of his or her environment entails, by its nature, a level of comfort
(or discomfort) with various aspects of that environment. Similarly, since previous training and
experience with cybersecurity-related activities entails a degree of real-world and simulated
events, it stands to reason that the factor of the PACRM model that is related to a manager’s
previous level of cybersecurity experience necessarily incorporates aspects of both the
performance accomplishments and vicarious experience sources, together with their concomitant
modes of induction.
In Bandura’s original research, he surmises that the performance accomplishment and
vicarious experience sources are both thought to exert a stronger influence over an individual’s
efficacy expectations than does the emotional arousal source. For that reason, we might expect
to see a relatively strong correlation between an IT manager’s previous level of experience with
cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a
cyberattack. However, that relationship will be somewhat mediated by the extent to which he or
she uses known cybersecurity best practices.
3.2

Conceptual Model Description
The argument that theory is an important component in confirmatory research is well

established in the psychometric literature (Blalock, 1969; Bagozzi, 1980). The use of theories to
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drive confirmatory research works because they help to pre-specify the nature of constructs,
which in turn informs the measurement of those constructs. In addition, the use of wellgrounded and clearly articulated theories propels research within a given domain by providing a
firm foundation upon which to build future research. Theory also aids in the clear specification
of measurements, thereby strengthening the conclusions garnered by those measurments
(Churchill, 1979).
Figure 6 shows that the factors for the model are organized into four main groups. The
first group is the IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity. It attempts to
answer RQ1a from above. The second group of factors attempts to capture the extent to which
the manager uses cybersecurity best practices. In doing so, it seeks to answer RQ1b. The third
group is a set of awareness-based factors that are related to RQ1c. The factors that comprise this
group attempt to capture the manager’s level of knowledge and awareness with various aspects
of his or her computer and network environment. The fourth group, relevant to RQ1d, is made
up of a single factor that looks at the degree to which the user community that the IT manager
supports is educated about issues related to information and computer security. Lastly, the IT
manager’s risk avoidance score on a group of variables serves as a moderator of the relationships
between the IT manager’s Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity and the Extent of
Use of Cybersecurity Best Practices factors.
Together, these factors are thought to inform the IT manager’s perceived readiness to
detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack. Table 3 lists the factors shown in
Figure 6, along with a short description of each.
Table 3: PACRM Factors and Descriptions of Their Associated Survey Elements

PACRM Model Factor
Hours of Cyber Threat Detection and
Prevention Training

Factor Description
The total amount of time that the IT manager
has spent engaged in cyber threat detection
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and prevention training. This variable may
include the time spent in formalized training
programs and/or spent preparing to obtain
cybersecurity related certifications.
Part of the summative factor, Level of
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity.
The level of self-reported experience with
stopping cyberattacks. The IT manager may
have obtained such experience through
training programs or through on-the-job
cybersecurity tasks, such as working as an
independent Certified Ethical Hacker© or as
a security specialist.

Level of Experience Stopping Cyberattacks

Part of the summative factor, Level of
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity.
The level of self-reported experience with
initiating cyberattacks. As with Level of
Experience Stopping Cyberattacks, the IT
manager may have gathered such experience
through formalized training sessions,
certification programs, or actual hacking
experience.

Level of Experience Initiating Cyberattacks

Part of the summative factor, Level of
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity.
Attempts to capture the IT Manager’s
attitudes toward risk avoidance in both
general terms and in terms of workplace
information security.
The extent of the IT manager’s use of
network activity logging mechanisms such
as IDS/IPS and sensor deployments and/or
traffic analyzers to capture actual network
events.

Personal Risk Avoidance Score

Extent of Use of Network Activity
Monitoring Mechanisms

Utilization of network activity monitoring
measures also implies the periodic and
systematic review of activity logs to look for
signs of suspicious activity or adverse
events.
The extent of the IT manager’s level of
control over physical access to computer and

Extent of Control Over Physical Access to
Network Resources
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network resources within his or her school or
department.
Restricting physical access can be achieved
through a combination of physical deterrents
(such as locked rooms and/or server
cabinets) or electronic means (such as by
locking the BIOS or using encryption).
The extent of the IT manager’s use of
preventative measures as part of his or her
computer security strategy.
The extent to the which the IT manager uses
regular backup processes as part of a
working backup policy of business-critical
computer resources.
The IT manager’s level of knowledge about
the volume, type, and integrity of network
traffic, which exists on the computer
network that he or she supports.

Extent of Use of Preventative Software
Measures
Extent of Use of a Backup Policy Where
Backups are Kept Offline

Perceived Awareness of the Immediate
Threat Environment

This measure also attempts to capture the IT
manager’s level of awareness that the
computers he or she supports are free from
viruses or malware and are not being used in
the support of illicit activities, such as in
support of a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack.
The IT manager’s level of knowledge about
the physical infrastructure of his or her
computer network as well as any potential
vulnerabilities that may exist.

Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities in
the Physical Infrastructure

The IT manager’s level of awareness of the
number of potential vulnerabilities in his or
her computer network as well as the physical
infrastructure of his or her computer
network.
The IT manager’s level of knowledge about
the type of defensive measures currently in
place to protect his or her computer network
from unauthorized access.

Perceived Awareness of Defensive
Measures in Place

The IT manager’s level of awareness of the
type of defensive measures that are in place
to secure his or her computer network.
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The degree to which the end user community
that the IT manager supports is educated on,
and aware of, several issues related to
computer and information security.

Degree of User Community Awareness of
Security Issues

3.3

Research Propositions
The four groups of factors, as mentioned above, are the IT manager’s previous level of

experience with cybersecurity, the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best practices, his or
her awareness of various aspects of the computer and information environment in and around the
organizational unit, and the degree to which the user community that he or she supports is
educated and aware of issues pertaining to security.
The first factor is a simple composite measure, comprised of the amount of time that the
IT manager has spent engaged in cyberattack detection and prevention training, either as a part of
a certification program or otherwise. Also included in this factor is the manager’s self-reported
level of previous experience with stopping cyberattacks and his or her self-reported level of
previous experience with initiating cyberattacks. Each of these activities may legitimately be
performed as one aspect of a training program or during work which is lawfully performed as a
security analyst. The IT manager’s overall level of previous cybersecurity experience is proposed
to have a positive relationship with each of the four factors associated with the Extent of Use of
Cybersecurity Best Practices factors. These relationships can be seen in Figure 6 above. As a
manager’s overall level of previous experience in cybersecurity increases, the extent of his or her
use of best practices should likewise increase. The decision to make the IT manager’s Level of
Previous Experience with Cybersecurity a summative measure was made early in the conceptual
design process. It was thought that, due to the sensitive nature of asking professionals to
voluntarily divulge the relative frequency that they have spent initiating cyberattacks, that a
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probable floor effect would be seen in that variable. Therefore, the decision was made to make it
part of a summative construct to help mitigate that possible effect.
The proposed relationships between the IT manager’s Level of Previous Cybersecurity
Experience and his or her Extent of Use of Cybersecurity Best Practices are moderated by his or
her level of Personal Risk Avoidance. Therefore, the relationship between an individual’s
previous experience with cybersecurity and the extent of that individual’s use of cybersecurity
best practices should be more pronounced for those individuals with a higher level of risk
avoidance.
The extent of an IT manager’s use of best practices contains four factors. These factors
attempt to capture information about the extent of the IT manager’s use of network activity
monitoring mechanisms, the extent to which the IT manager exercises physical control to
computer and network resources, the extent of the IT manager’s use of preventative measures
such as firewalls and strong passwords, and the extent of the IT manager’s use of a backup
policy with backups that are kept offline. Each of these factors are proposed to be related to the
perceived readiness factors in the following ways.
First, the Extent of the Use of Network Activity Monitoring Mechanisms factor examines
the degree to which the IT manager uses activity logging mechanisms such as IDS/IPS
deployments and/or sensor deployments to capture and log real-time network events. This factor
also measures whether log data, if it is captured, undergoes a systematic review to search for
signs of adverse events or suspicious activity. This factor is therefore proposed to have a
positive relationship with the manager’s Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks. The reasoning
behind this proposed relationship is that an IT manager should find him or herself in a more

44

advantageous position to detect a cyberattack if he or she is periodically willing and able to
capture and review network activity log data.
The second factor in this group is the Extent of Control Over Physical Access to Network
Resources factor. Restricting physical access to sensitive computer and network resources has
been shown to be effective in reducing incidents of computer abuse. The relationship between
this factor and the manager’s Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks is therefore proposed to be
a positive one.
Third, the Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures factor is likewise thought be
positively related to the Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks factor. Preventative software
measures include the use of strong passwords to authenticate users as well as the use of antivirus
and anti-malware software to check for malicious software on the computer. In addition,
software-defined firewalls prevent unauthorized intrusions that originate from outside the
computer. Regular critical software and operating system updates are also thought to contribute
to this factor.
Finally, the Extent of Use of a Backup Policy Where Backups are Kept Offline factor is
thought to have a positive relationship to Perceived Readiness to Recover from an Attack. This
proposed relationship is based on the reasoning that offline backups can be used to preserve
clean copies of the organizational unit’s data, which can then be used to recover services in the
event of a malicious attack. Since hackers often target online backups to manipulate them in the
same manner as they have done with the primary system, the offline component of this factor is
deemed to be especially important component of this factor.
The perceived awareness factors consist of three general elements. First, Perceived
Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment attempts to capture the level of knowledge and

45

awareness that the IT manager has about the volume, type, and integrity of network traffic on
both the network that he or she supports and any intersecting networks. This factor is proposed
to have direct, positive relationships with both Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks, and
Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks. Therefore, the greater the manager’s awareness of the
threat environment, i.e. the more comfortable he or she feels about the state of knowledge about
the status of the computer network, then the greater the readiness he or she should feel to detect
and prevent any potential cyberattacks against that network.
The second factor in the awareness-based group is the Perceived Awareness of
Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure factor. This factor attempts to capture whether the
IT manager is knowledgeable about both the physical infrastructure of the organizational unit’s
computer network and any potential vulnerabilities within that infrastructure. This factor is
thought to have a positive relationship with Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks. As a
manager’s level of knowledge and awareness about the physical infrastructure of the computer
network increases, so too will his or her perceived readiness to prevent a potential cyberattack.
The final factor in the awareness-based group is Perceived Awareness of Defensive
Measures in Place. The term “defensive measures” is left vague by design. Such measures may
be procedural (sign-in sheets to access sensitive computer or data resources, etc.), physical
(restricted physical access, separate subnets and physical connections for sensitive resources,
etc.), or electronic (firewalls, IPSs, etc.). Rather than list all, or even a subset, of the possible
defensive measures, it was instead determined that the purpose of this factor is to capture the IT
manager’s level of knowledge and awareness of whatever defensive measures he or she has in
place. This factor is proposed to positively affect Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks. As
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the manager’s level of knowledge and awareness of his or her defenses increases, so too should
his or her perceived readiness to prevent cyberattacks.
Finally, the Degree of User Community Awareness About Issues Pertaining to Security
factor is thought to be positively related to both Perceived Readiness to Detect Attacks and
Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks. Several of the IT managers who were interviewed
during the initial pilot testing phase of the project remarked that their readiness to detect and
prevent cyberattacks is largely dependent on their users. It was therefore determined that the
awareness of an organizational unit’s user community on various issues related to computer and
information security could be a vital component in determining the IT manager’s perceived
readiness to detect and prevent cyberattacks. Aspects of user community awareness may include
the need to keep computer operating systems and applications consistently updated, the need to
exercise caution when bringing external USB drives and storage devices into the workplace, the
need to exercise caution when downloading and installing software from the Internet, the need to
exercise caution when confronting communication situations that could potentially divulge
sensitive information to unauthorized personnel, and the need to exercise caution when opening
email attachments or clickable links. Table 4 lists the proposition number, as illustrated in
Figure 6 presented above, along with a short description of each.
Table 4: PACRM Propositions and Their Associated Descriptions

PACRM
Proposition
Number
1
2

Proposition Description
The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is
positively related to the extent of his or her use of network activity
monitoring mechanisms.
The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is
positively related to the extent of his or her control over unauthorized
physical access to computer or network resources within the school or
department.
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3
4
5

6

7

8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is
positively related to the extent of his or her use of preventative software
measures.
The IT manager’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity is
positively related to the extent of his or her use of a backup policy where
the backups are kept offline.
The extent of the IT manager’s use of network activity monitoring
mechanisms will be greater for those managers who show a greater level of
risk avoidance then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant,
holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant.
The extent of the IT manager’s control over physical access to the
computer network will be greater for those managers who show a greater
level of risk avoidance, then it will be for managers who are less risk
avoidant, holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant.
The extent of the IT manager’s use of software preventative measures will
be greater for those managers who show a greater level of risk avoidance,
then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant, holding previous
level of cybersecurity experience constant.
The extent of the IT manager’s use of a backup policy where backups are
kept offline will be greater for those managers who show a greater level of
risk avoidance, then it will be for managers who are less risk avoidant,
holding previous level of cybersecurity experience constant.
The extent to which the IT manager uses network activity monitoring
mechanisms is positively related to his or her perceived readiness to detect
cyberattacks.
The extent to which the IT manager controls physical access to network
resources is positively related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent
cyberattacks.
The extent to which the IT manager uses preventative software measures is
positively related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent cyberattacks.
The extent to which the IT manager uses a backup policy where the
backups are kept offline is positively related to his or her perceived
readiness to recover from a cyberattack.
The IT manger’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat environment
in and around his or her organizational unit is positively related to his or
her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack.
The IT manager’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat
environment in and around his or her organizational unit is positively
related to his or her perceived readiness to prevent a cyberattack.
The IT manager’s perceived awareness of vulnerabilities in the physical
infrastructure he or she supports is positively related to his or her perceived
readiness to prevent a cyberattack.
The IT manager’s perceived awareness of defensive measures in place is
positively related with his or her perceived readiness to prevent a
cyberattack.
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17

The degree of user community awareness of security issues is positively
related with the IT manager’s perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack.
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4

4.1

METHODOLOGY

PACRM Measurement Model
Each of the conceptual factors listed above have their associated elements in the PACRM

survey, which is presented in its initial iteration in Appendix B and in its final version as
Appendix C. For the convenience of the reader, Table 5 presents the full measurment model
detailing how each factor is to be measured.
Table 5: PACRM Measurement Model

Concept
Previous
Experience

Construct
Level of Previous
Experience with
Cybersecurity

Survey Items
PE.3
PE.4.1
PE.4.2





Risk Avoidance

Personal Risk
Avoidance Score

D.8.1
D.8.2
D.8.3





Network Activity
Monitoring

Extent of Use of
Network Activity
Monitoring
Mechanisms

EU.1.1
EU.1.2
EU.1.3
EU.2.1
EU2.2
EU2.3
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Description
Number of hours spent taking
part in cybersecurity training.
Previous level of experience
with preventing or stopping
cyberattacks.
Previous level of experience
initiating cyberattacks.
General risk avoidance
Risk avoidance in work
settings.
Risk avoidance in terms of
information security at work.
Extent of Use of and frequency
checking network activity logs
to monitor network activity.
Extent of Use of and frequency
monitoring IDS and /or IPS
reports on the network.
Extent of Use of and frequency
analyzing sensor deployment
and/or traffic analyzer reports
for the network.

Physical Access
Control

Extent of Control
over Physical
Access to
Network
Resources

EU.1.4
EU.1.5
EU.1.6
EU.2.4





Preventative
Measures

Extent of Use of
Preventative
Software
Measures

EU.1.7
EU.1.8
EU.1.9
EU1.10
EU1.11
EU1.12
EU.2.5
EU.2.6
EU.2.7
EU.2.8
EU.2.9
EU.2.10









Regular Offline
Backups
User Community
Awareness

Extent of Use of a
Backup Policy
Where Backups
are Kept Offline
Degree of User
Community
Awareness of
Security Issues

EU.1.13
EU.2.11



ED.1.1
ED.1.2
ED.1.3
ED.1.4
ED.1.5
ED.1.6
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Extent of use of controlling
physical access to network and
server resources.
Servers or other vital computer
resources are secured in a
locked room or server cabinet.
Extent of use of computers
with a locked BIOS where it is
impossible to boot from an
external device.
Computers with encrypted
hard drives.
Servers or other vital computer
resources with encrypted hard
drives.
Strong passwords updated
regularly to prevent
unauthorized use.
Computers protected with
antivirus software that is
updated regularly.
Computers protected with antimalware software that is
updated regularly.
Computers protected by one or
more firewalls with settings
updated to reflect current and
emerging threats and to allow
for approved applications.
Critical software and operating
system updates.
Regular backups of servers or
other vital computer resources
that are then kept offline.
Users are educated about the
need to update work computer
operating system and/or
applications regularly.
Users are educated about the
need to update work computer
antivirus definitions regularly.
Users are educated about the
need to exercise caution when
using an external USB drive.







IT Manager
Awareness of
Threat
Environment



Perceived
Awareness of
Immediate
Threat
Environment

PA.1.1
PA.1.2
PA.2.1
PA.2.2

IT Manager
Awareness of
Physical
Infrastructure

Perceived
Awareness of
Vulnerabilities in
Physical
Infrastructure

PA.1.3
PA.1.4
PA.2.3
PA.2.4



IT Manager
Awareness of
Defensive
Measures in
Place
Readiness to
Detect Attacks

Perceived
Awareness of
Defensive
Measures in
Place
Perceived
Readiness to
Detect Attacks

PA.1.5
PA.2.5



PR.1.1
PR.1.2
PR.2.1









Readiness to
Prevent Attacks

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent Attacks

PR.1.3
PR.1.4
PR.2.2
PR.2.3
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Users are educated about the
need to exercise caution when
downloading and installing
software or apps from
untrusted sources.
Users are educated about the
need to exercise caution when
engaging in conversations
about sensitive information.
Users are educated about the
need to exercise caution when
opening email attachments and
clickable links in email.
Level of knowledge and
awareness about the volume
and type of network traffic
flowing through the network.
Level of knowledge and
awareness about the integrity
of network traffic on
intersecting networks.
Level of knowledge and
awareness about the physical
infrastructure of the network.
Level of knowledge and
awareness about potential
vulnerabilities within the
network.
Level of knowledge and
awareness about type of
defensive measures in place.
Perceived ability and readiness
to detect whether computer or
network resources have been
compromised.
Perceived ability and readiness
to detect whether computer or
network resources are being
used in support of illegal
activities.
Perceived ability and readiness
to prevent a cyberattack from
stealing sensitive information.




Readiness to
Recover from
Attacks

Perceived
Readiness to
Recover from
Attacks

PR.1.5
PR.2.4
PR.2.5





4.2

Perceived ability and readiness
to prevent a ransom ware
attack.
Perceived ability and readiness
to prevent a ransom ware from
encrypting sensitive data
resources.
Perceived ability and readiness
to recover users’ access to
computer resources in the
event of a ransom ware attack
without paying the ransom.
Perceived readiness to recover
data resources after they have
been deleted or encrypted as
the result of a cyber or ransom
ware attack.

Instrument Validity
Knowledge about a given phenomenon can only be clearly established when it can be

successfully demonstrated that the means of measurement accurately represent the theoretical
constructs that they are intended to measure. The question then becomes, how can researchers
ensure “goodness of fit” between measurement instruments and the theoretical constructs they
are intended to measure? The process by which this occurs is known as instrument validation,
which has been well articulated in previous research (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Instrument
validation seeks to establish several different types of validities. Those validities, along with the
questions they seek to answer, are presented in Figure 7. The figure is adopted from Detmar
Straub’s (1989) article entitled, “Validating Research Instruments”.
As Cook and Campbell note, and as Straub’s figure indicates, the process of instrument
validation should precede other core statistical and empirical validities such as statistical
conclusion validity. This is because most statistical tests to establish internal validity and
statistical conclusion validity are based on the assumption that the error terms between the
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observations are uncorrelated (Hair, et al., 1979; Lindman, 1974). As Straub (1989) notes, if
participants in a research study answer in some way that is a function of the instrument instead of
the underlying constructs, this assumption will be violated. For statistical tests that are not
robust in this regard, a violation of this assumption will present itself in the form of unstable
parameter estimates and unusually large standard errors (Lindman, 1974).

Figure 7: Step by Step Process of Instrument Validity (Straub, 1989)

Construct validity seeks to answer the question of whether the data is measuring a true
phenomenon, or is merely an artifact of the measurment instrument itself (Cronbach, 1971;
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Campbell & Fiske, 1959). In order to answer this question, correlations between observations
are studied. If the observations reflect valid constructs in this sense, then one should expect to
see high correlations among measurements that are intended to measure the same construct, even
when using different methods, and low correlations between measures that are intended to
measure different constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Campbell and Fiske argue that the
multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approach works well as a means of establishing construct
validity. Other methods that have been shown to establish construct validity are confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) and principal components analysis (PCA) (Long, 1983; Nunnally, 1967).
Construct validity is established when correlations among similar items, or “traits”, are
sufficiently associated with one another, but significantly different than zero. This is the case
when demonstrating convergent validity. Disimilar items that are sufficiently different from one
another demonstrate discriminant validity.
In addition to construct validity, instrument validation is concerned with a measurement
instrument’s reliability. It is possible that participants’ answers on any particular survey item are
a function of their understanding of the item instead of the underlying construct it is meant to
represent. This can be due either to the way in which the survey was administered, or because
the item itself is ambiguous or otherwise misleading. When the responses on one or more survey
items differ from alternative measures of those same items, that measurement instrument is said
to have poor reliability. Reliability, therefore, is an evaluation of measurement accuracy
(Cronbach, 1951). Large Cronbach’s alphas indicate high correlations among similar or same
items, which is a good indication that the measures are reliable.
Moving beyond instrument validation, internal validity is concerned with whether or not
observed effects could be the result of unmeasured variables. In essence, measures of internal
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validity seek to determine whether rival explanations, other than the researcher’s hypotheses,
could be responsible for an instrument’s findings. Within the MIS discipline, the importance of
establishing internal validity has been previously argued by Jarvenpaa, Dickson, & DeSanctis
(1984).
Lastly, statistical conclusion validity is an assessment of whether the mathematical
correlations between variables are likely due to chance, or to some true underlying covariation,
which is presumed to be the result of the researcher’s theoretical assumptions (Cook &
Campbell, 1979). Errors in the conclusions regarding true covariation between variables
represent violations of statistical conclusion validity, and can be affected by both sample size and
the reliability of the measurment instrument. Statistical conclusion validity can also be
determined by the power of a statistical test. The statistical power of a test is closely associated
with sample size, so that tests which employ larger sample sizes inherently have more power,
and are therefore less likely to improperly reject the null hypothesis (Baroudi & Orlikowski,
1989; Cohen, 1969; Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987).
Straub (1989) makes the point that many common statistical techniques, such as
regression, MANCOVA, factor analysis, and LISREL, make no conclusions regarding the
viability of rival assumptions or the meaningfulness of the underlying theoretical constructs.
Statistical conclusions of validity simply evaluate measurement results based on their
mathematical correlations. Without prior instrument validation, the possibility remains that
those correlations are due to some spurious explanation, such as unaccounted-for moderator
variables (Sharma, Durand, & Gur-Arie, 1981), or misspecification of the underlying theoretical
model (Blalock, 1969). As Straub notes, conducting instrument validation prior to tests of
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statistical conclusion validity strengthens the research study’s findings because the effects of
extraneous moderator variables and rival hypotheses have been previously controlled for.
Instrument validation will occur on the PACRM measurement instrument in the
following manner. Building on Straub’s (1989) example for instrument validation, the validation
of the PACRM survey will be conducted in three stages. Stages one and two comprise the pilot
test phase while stage 3 comprises the roll-out phase. The pilot test phase will test the content
validity of the proposed survey while the roll-out phase will test its construct validity and
reliability. Lastly, the model will be tested in a structural analysis framework using averaged
scores on the measurement variables to represent the constructs.
The instrument is designed to elicit responses from IT managers who are employed at the
organizational-unit level at complex, multi-tiered organizations. For the initial study, the
organizations targeted will be colleges and universities in the United States. The four groups of
factors discussed in Chapter 3 above have been organized into respective blocks of questions on
the survey. Each block contains survey questions that correspond to the measurement model
elements listed in Table 5.
4.3

Pilot Test Phase Overview
During this phase, the draft survey was presented to IT managers who matched the

participant specifications for the project. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with a
number of workgroup IT managers working at a large public university in the southeastern
United States. Interviewees were prompted to answer open-ended, qualitative questions
regarding their cybersecurity practices, their perceptions of the need for awareness to several
factors related to computer and network security, and the roles that previous experience in
cybersecurity and attitudes towards risk have in shaping their perceptions of their cybersecurity
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readiness. The interview questions that were used appear as Appendix A in this document.
Concepts that were independently raised by multiple participants were noted and the precise
language was recorded in order to capture any perceptual communalities in mental constructs
between the participants. This helped to establish the content validity of the instrument.
The second part of stage 1 involved the participants taking an initial draft of the survey,
during which they were encouraged to “think aloud.” The think-aloud protocol has been
previously used in Management Information Systems (MIS) studies where new survey
instruments were proposed (Hilkert, et al., 2011), as well as in many psychology studies. Notes
were recorded by the primary researcher and any commonalities between respondants were
incorporated into subsequent drafts of the survey.
In stage two of the pilot test phase, the survey was administered as a web-based,
Qualtrics survey to a number of IT managers working at the school or department level at several
colleges and universities throughout the southeastern United States. The survey responses
generated during this stage of testing were subjected to tests of reliability using the Cronbach’s
alpha technique. It has been shown that the reliability and overall construct validity of a
proposed instrument can be further established through factorial methods such as Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) (Long, 1983; Nunnally, 1967). However, the number of responses
were not of a sufficient quantity during stage 2 to conduct a valid PCA analysis. The results of
the Cronbach’s alpha test, therefore, are shown in Table 12 below.
4.4

Stage 1 Results
Stage 1 consisted of qualitative interviews with a number of IT managers who all work at

the decentralized school or department level of a large, public university located in the
southeastern United States. During this stage, each manager provided answers to all of the
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interview questions and participated in an initial draft of the PACRM survey. Table 6 provides
some basic demographic information for this initial test group.
Table 6: Basic Demographic Data for Stage 1 Test Group

Gender

Number of
Participants

Male
Female

3
1

Approximate Approximate Approximate
Academic
Mean Age
Mean Years Mean Years Departments
of
of
Supported
Experience
Experience
in the IT
in IT
Field
Positions in
Higher
Education
54.17
22.5
17.5
3
--7.5
7.5
1

As can be seen in Appendix A of this document, the interview questions were designed to
elicit responses to the factors that were thought to be relevant to increasing an IT manager’s level
of cybersecurity readiness. Respondents were asked to assess the roles that best practices,
awareness of computer and network security, previous level of experience in cybersecurity, the
number and type of cybersecurity-related certifications, and the importance of attitudes towards
risk had in shaping their perceptions of their cybersecurity readiness. The frequency of common
responses, which reflect the managers’ answers for each survey question are listed below in
Tables 7-11.
Table 7: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 1 ‐ Best Practices

Educate
User
Community
3

Operating
Use of
Control
Use of
Use of
System and Preventative Physical
Backup
Encryption
Application
Software
Access Procedures
Management
Measures
1
2
2
2
1

Table 8: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 2 ‐ Awareness of Network Security

Know Your
Contacts in

Keep up
to Date
on

Understand It
to the Level
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Be a
Good
Educator

the
Organization
2

Current
Threats
1

of Your
Responsibility
1

1

Table 9: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 3 ‐ Importance of Previous Experience with
Cybersecurity

Training is
Previous
an
Experience
Important with Being
but not Key Hacked is
Factor
Vital
1
1

SelfEducation /
Continuing
Education is
the Key
3

Table 10: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 4 ‐ Importance of the Number and Type of
Certifications

Certifications Certifications
Are an
Are Not
Important
Important
Factor
1
2

Depends on
the Type of
Certification
1

Table 11: Stage 1 Frequency of Answers Related to Specific Elements for Question 5 ‐ Importance of Attitudes Towards Risk

Important to
be Risk
Avoidant
3

Awareness of
Risk is
Important
1

The relatively high frequency of responses that were generated in the pre and post-survey
interview questions that stressed the importance of educating the user community on issues
related to information security led to the inclusion of the Degree of User Community Awareness
of Security Issues factor in the PACRM model and an additional block of survey questions on the
instrument. These changes are reflected in Appendix A as well as in the PACRM model,
illustrated in Figures 1 and 6 of this dissertation. Overall, the pre-test stage 1 qualitative
interview questions were helpful in refining the content validity of the survey questions. For
example, in addition to the inclusion of the additional factor, the negative reaction that was
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evident in the responses, with regard to the number and type of cybersecurity-related
certifications, combined with the ubiquity with which the managers indicated that they had zero
cybersecurity-related certifications, led to the thinking that this factor should be removed from
the model. Although it was evident that it should not be part of the present analysis, the question
was left in the survey to gather data for future research. Therefore, the survey was modified to
combine multiple questions related to that subject into a single, optional question that asks
respondants to list any cybersecurity-related certifications that they currently hold.
Likewise, the “think aloud” protocol that the managers engaged in while taking the initial
draft of the survey instrument highlighted many potential areas for improvement. Primarily,
each of the managers surveyed found the survey length to be “reasonable,” “okay,” and “about
right.” One of the respondants remarked that age should be the first question in the survey, and
this was deemed a reasonable suggestion. As such, that change was made in subsequent drafts of
instrument. In addition, two areas of concern with the survey became evident through this
exercise. First, several of the managers visibly reacted to the question about their level of
experience with initiating cyberattacks. Recall that this reaction was anticipated during the
conceptual development phase of the project, which is why the item was designed as one
component of a summative measure. Furthermore, the data shows a tendency towards a possible
floor effect on this item with the majority of managers (n=3) indicating “No Experience at All”
and the last manager (n=1) indicating “a Little Experience.” While no conclusions can be made
from such a small sample size, the visceral reaction that the majority of managers displayed
indicates that the researchers were correct in anticipating a floor effect for this measure.
Second, the think aloud exercise also demonstrated a degree of confusion among the
managers with respect to the perceived awareness questions. These questions are included as
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PA.2 in Appendix B. All four managers expressed audible consternation at the wording in that
particular grouping. In post-survey followup questions, it was determined that every manager
who supported a user community felt uncomfortable with their level of security. However, they
felt powerless to do anything about it because so much of the responsibility for securing work
computers lies with the user community. This was deemed to be further evidence of the need for
an additional block of questions related to user community awareness of security issues.
Furthermore, this block of questions was placed ahead of the perceived awareness questions in
the survey as a way to ameliorate managers’ overall level of concern.
4.5

Stage 2 Results
Stage 2 consisted of 25 total responses from workgroup IT managers working at colleges

and universities throughout the southeastern United States. Frequency distributions for
participant age and years of experience in IT by gender are shown in Figures 8 and 9 below.
6
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1
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Figure 8: Frequency of Stage 2 Participants by Age in Years Broken Out by Gender
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25‐29
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Figure 9: Frequency of Stage 2 Participants by Years of Experience in IT Broken Out by Gender

The measure asking about participants’ experience with initiating cyberattacks continued to
be low at this stage of data collection, as evidenced by a mean value of 1.48. This indicates that
the majority of managers surveyed stated that they had a little experience or no experience at all
with initiating cyberattacks. Because the question contained language that made it clear that
legitimate hacking, such as might be performed as part of a training program or as a Certified
Ethical Hacker (CEH), was to be included, the results indicate either a reluctance on the part of
IT managers to divulge what may be illicit activities or genuine inexperience. If this trend is also
seen in stage 3 of this study, it may indicate a possible area of intervention for cybersecurityrelated training. By holding hacking training where IT managers participate in simulated
hacking exercises, it may be possible to raise manager’s perceptions of their own cybersecurity
readiness.
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Cronbach’s alpha statistics were generated for the 25 cases for all of the constructs listed in
Table 5 of this dissertation. The overall statistics, which are presented in Table 12 below, show
that a majority of the factors show good reliability. Of the thirteen constructs tested, 10 had
Cronbach’s alpha values of .70 or above. The value of .70 is, of course, a guideline for
demonstrating good reliability among measures. However, previous MIS researchers have, on
occasion, adopted lower values. For example, Siponen et al., adopted a threshold value of .608
to demonstrate internal reliability of their measures (2010). In this study, Perceived Awareness
of Immediate Threat Environment had a Cronbach’s alpha of .663, which indicates that a change
of wording may be appropriate in future drafts of the survey for some of the questions that are
associated with this measure.
Table 12: Cronbach's Alpha Statistics for Stage 2 PACRM Constructs

Construct

Cronbach’s Alpha

Number
of Items

.722

Cronbach’s
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items
.741

Level of Previous
Experience with
Cybersecurity
Personal Risk Avoidance
Score
Extent of Use of Network
Activity Monitoring
Mechanisms
Extent of Control over
Physical Access to
Network Resources
Extent of Use of
Preventative Software
Measures
Extent of Use of a Backup
Policy Where Backups are
Kept Offline
Degree of User Community
Awareness of Security
Issues

.476

.475

3

.939

.939

6

.805

.814

4

.915

.912

12

.876

.879

2

.861

.865

6
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Perceived Awareness of
Immediate Threat
Environment
Perceived Awareness of
Vulnerabilities in Physical
Infrastructure
Perceived Awareness of
Defensive Measures in
Place
Perceived Readiness to
Detect Attacks
Perceived Readiness to
Prevent Attacks
Perceived Readiness to
Recover from Attacks

.663

.639

4

.795

.788

5

.012

.012

2

.813

.811

3

.920

.921

4

.916

.919

3

The risk measure demonstrated exceedingly poor reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of
.476, which indicates that a significant rewording of the questions associated with this measure is
needed. In addition, Cronbach’s alpha statistics will need to be generated on the stage 3 data set
to ensure that all the proposed constructs demonstrate good reliability before proceeding with
further analysis.
Lastly, Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures in Place had a Cronbach’s alpha of
.012. There were just two items associated with this measure and on closer inspection, it was
deemed that they were, in fact, measuring two very different things. Specifically, the two items
attempted to capture the IT manager’s level of knowledge and comfort with the defensive
measures that he or she has in place to keep his or her supported computer resources secure.
Since the nature of Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures in Place is, in fact, a measure of
the IT manager’s level of awareness with the defensive measures that he or she has in place, the
most prudent course of action is to alter the language of the measure to make that more explicit.
In that case, the construct should then be retested for reliability before proceeding with further
analysis.
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4.6

Roll-Out Phase Overview
In stage 3 of the project, approximately 160 IT managers who work at the school or

department level of colleges and universities in other regions of the United States were surveyed.
This final group of participants represented unit-level IT administration in line with the proposed
scope of the project. Due to the complexities of modeling the effects of organizational culture on
individual behavior, it was not deemed prudent to survey multiple individuals per institution.
This is especially true given the relatively small number of responses that were collected.
Therefore, one individual per institution was surveyed to ameliorate the confounding effect of
observations that are grouped within institutions.
To ensure that this procedure was followed, the principal researcher personally contacted
individuals at colleges and universities via email or phone. This was necessary to describe the
nature of the project and to determine whether each potential subject meets the demographic
specifications of the target population. The principal researcher then attempted to discern
whether each potential respondent was a workgroup IT manager who is working at the school or
department level prior to cultivating the actual survey response. In this way, the researcher
sought to ensure a high degree of applicability and appropriateness of the underlying data set.
Furthermore, the fact that only one response was gathered from each institution hopefully
guaranteed a broad generalizability of the data.
4.7

Psychometric Analysis Overview
Additional Cronbach’s alpha statistics were run on the full stage 3 data set to test whether

the revised survey displayed good reliability for the complete set of measures. A Confirmatory
Factor Analysis (CFA) was then performed to examine the underlying characteristics of the
measurement model as well as the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs.
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4.8

Structural Model Analysis Overview
Since this is an exploratory study with a limited number of observations, the researcher used

average scores to represent each of the constructs. Given the complexity of the conceptual
model, stage 3 simply did not garner enough observations to allow for a full Structural Equation
Model (SEM) of the underlying PACRM theoretical and measurement models at the same time.
However, the previous round of psychometric analysis helped to validate the underlying
measurement model, so that a full SEM analysis proved redundant at this stage. Rather, a path
analysis was conducted to validate the proposed paths.
4.9

Stage 3 Results
Stage 3 of the PACRM instrument validation process was conducted over a twenty-two-

week period from mid-January to mid-June of 2018. During that time, 1,030 individual IT
administrators who work at 4-year public colleges and universities across the United States were
contacted through a combination of electronic mail and telephone. The panel resulted in 161
survey responses, which represents a final conversion rate of 15.631 percent. Of the 161 survey
responses submitted, 26 of them were removed due to partial or incomplete responses. These
responses were deleted using listwise deletion. Therefore, the final stage 3 dataset consisted of
135 complete responses with no missing data.
The survey was fully anonymized within the Qualtrics research system so that the researcher
was unable to match responses to individual panel members beyond the institutional level. This
was done intentionally to maintain the maximum practical anonymization of the data at this stage
of the collection process. To ensure maximum variability between institutions, only three
respondents were contacted per institution. Once the researcher could feasibly rule out the
potential for duplicate responses arising from the same institution, the distributions were deleted
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after thirty days, thereby eliminating the researcher’s ability to match responses at the
institutional level. Institutions were identified through a database query from the National
Center for Education Statistics on December 12, 2017 in which the names and web site addresses
of all 4-year, public higher education institutions in the United States were pulled (National
Center for Education Statistics).
As was the case with the Stage 2 results, frequency distributions for participant age and
years of experience in IT by gender are shown in Figures 10 and 11 below.
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
20‐24
years

25‐29
years

30‐34
years

35‐39
years
Male

40‐44
years
Female

45‐49
years

50‐54
years

No Indic.

Figure 10: Frequency of Stage 3 Participants by Age in Years Broken Out by Gender
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Figure 11: Frequency of Stage 3 Participants by Years of Experience in IT Broken Out by Gender

4.10 Pretest Study Results
To establish construct validity on the PACRM survey, a CFA was run on the stage 3 dataset
using the SPSS AMOS statistical package, version 25. Prior to running the CFA, the
factorability of the dataset was tested using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy (KMO MSA) technique. The KMO MSA statistic showed that the dataset displayed
good overall factorability with a value of .874.
The CFA essentially tests the measurement model listed in Table 5 of this dissertation. It
tests the pattern of relationships between the measurement model and the latent constructs
hypothesized. Prior to running the CFA, however, Cronbach’s alpha statistics were once again
generated for the 135 cases in the stage 3 dataset. The overall statistics, which are presented in
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Table 13 below, show that all the factors displayed good reliability, as denoted by a Cronbach’s
alpha of .70 or above.
Table 13: Cronbach's Alpha Statistics for Stage 3 PACRM Constructs

Construct

Cronbach’s Alpha

Number
of Items

.700

Cronbach’s
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items
.741

Level of Previous
Experience with
Cybersecurity
Personal Risk Avoidance
Score
Extent of Use of Network
Activity Monitoring
Mechanisms
Extent of Control over
Physical Access to
Network Resources
Extent of Use of
Preventative Software
Measures
Extent of Use of a Backup
Policy Where Backups are
Kept Offline
Degree of User Community
Awareness of Security
Issues
Perceived Awareness of
Immediate Threat
Environment
Perceived Awareness of
Vulnerabilities in Physical
Infrastructure
Perceived Awareness of
Defensive Measures in
Place
Perceived Readiness to
Detect Attacks
Perceived Readiness to
Prevent Attacks
Perceived Readiness to
Recover from Attacks

.766

.765

3

.929

.929

6

.775

.776

4

.905

.906

12

.826

.832

2

.883

.884

6

.904

.904

4

.882

.886

4

.814

.820

2

.889

.891

3

.908

.908

4

.888

.891

3
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As stated above, the CFA is based on the survey responses from 135 workgroup IT
managers who work at institutions of higher learning across the United States. Since the number
of observations in the dataset was lower than what would be needed for a full-scale analysis, the
full measurement model was subdivided into three subset models of theoretically related factors
(Bentler & Chou, 1987). These factor groups were the four practice related factors enumerated
above together with the previous experience and risk factors, the three awareness factors, and the
user community awareness factor. In each sub-model, the group of factors were tested in
relation to the three response factors, which represent the IT manager’s perceived readiness to
detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack.
Kline (2005) suggests that appropriate model fit indices to include from a CFA are the ChiSquare test, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The Chi-Square (𝜒 )
statistic has been the traditional parameter for making judgements about the acceptability of
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A good fitting model would result in an insignificant result at
the .05 threshold. There are, however, a number of severe restrictions on its use. Primarily,
departures from multivariate normality in the data may result in model rejections even in models
that are properly specified (Hooper et al., 2008). Secondly, Chi-Square is sensitive to sample
size. Therefore, the Chi-Square statistic nearly always rejects the model where datasets are large
enough (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). For these reasons, alternative fit statistics have been sought
out. One such statistic is the Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio (Wheaton et al., 1977).
Generally speaking, a chi-square/d.f. ratio of less than 3.0 indicates an acceptable level of fit
(Marsh et al., 2004), although values as high as 5.0 (Wheaton et al., 1977) and as low as 2.0
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) have also been argued for.
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The Comparative Fit Index (Bentler P. , 1990) is a revised form of the Normed Fit Index
(NFI) that takes into account sample size. Compared with the NFI, the CFI performs well even
when sample size is small (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As with the NFI, CFI values range from
zero to 1.0 with values closer to 1.0 indicating good model fit. A cut-off point greater than .90
has been generally been accepted as the standard needed to ensure that misspecified models are
not accepted (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
(SRMR) index indicates the difference between the square root of the residuals of the sample
covariance matrix and the hypothesized covariance model (Kline, 2005). As with the Root Mean
Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), values below .06 indicate a good model fit. However, it
has been argued that values as high as .08 are acceptable for both statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
4.11 Subset Model 1: Practice Related Factors
Four Extent of Use constructs were originally hypothesized. These included Extent of Use
of Network Activity Monitoring Mechanisms, Extent of Control over Physical Access to Network
Resources, Extent of Use of Preventative Software Measures, and Extent of Use of a Backup
Policy Where Backups are Kept Offline. These four factors were placed into a CFA model
together with the Level of Previous Experience with Cybersecurity and Personal Risk Avoidance
constructs, since these six constructs were hypothesized to have relationships with the dependent
factors, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 6 of this dissertation. Upon examing the factor loadings, it
was determined that five measurement variables could be dropped from further analysis since
these variables had loadings on their respective factors that were less than the traditional .5
threshold. Furthermore, it was clear from the initial loadings that the Extent of Use of
Preventative Software Measures was, in fact, a combination of two latent factors. Three of the
measurement variables (the ones related to software preventative measures) loaded together as a
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group while the remaining six variables (the ones related to frequency of use of preventative
measures) loaded as a noticably distinct second group on the factor. Therefore, a new CFA was
performed, which reflected these loadings. The Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio was
2.573 (𝜒 =1325.042, d.f.=515), with a CFI of .809, and an SRMR of .0754. Table 14 lists the
CFA measurement variables and their related constructs along with the variables that were
dropped after the initial analysis due to low factor loadings.
Table 14: Practice Related Factors and their Associated Measurement Variables

Construct

Drop

Level of
Previous
Experience
with
Cybersecurity

drop

Item
Standardized
Number Regression
Weight
PE.3
.412
PE4.1

.873

PE4.2

.667

D8.1
D8.2
D8.3
EU1.1
EU1.2
EU1.3
EU2.1
EU2.2
EU2.3
EU1.4

.594
.813
.679
.744
.785
.736
.905
.944
.854
.893

EU1.5

.861

EU1.6

.362

EU2.4

.722

drop

EU1.7

.435

drop

EU1.8

.449

drop

EU1.9

.464

EU1.10

.931

Personal Risk
Avoidance
Score
Extent of Use
of Network
Activity
Monitoring
Mechanisms
Extent of
Control over
Physical
Access to
Network
Resources
Extent of Use
of
Preventative
Software
Measures

drop
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EU1.11

.764

EU1.12

.762

EU2.5

.514

EU2.6

.920

EU2.7

.927

EU2.8

.871

EU2.9

.805

EU2.10

.750

Extent of Use
of a Backup
Policy Where
Backups are
Kept Offline
Perceived
Readiness to
Detect
Attacks

EU1.13

.729

EU2.11

.985

PR1.1

.824

PR1.2

.909

PR2.1

.833

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent
Attacks

PR1.3

.946

PR1.4

.885

PR2.2

.800

PR2.3

.813

PR1.5

.832

PR2.4

.869

PR2.5

.881

Frequency of
Use of
Preventative
Measures

Perceived
Readiness to
Recover from
Attacks

4.12 Subset Model 2: Awareness Related Factors
The second CFA tested the construct validity of the awareness group of factors from the
original PACRM measurement model. The factors that were included in this group included
Perceived Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment, Perceived Awareness of
Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure, and Perceived Awareness of the Defensive
Measures in Place. As was the case with subset model 1, these three factors were put into a
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CFA with the three perceived readiness constructs. The resulting CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f.
ratio of 4.587 (𝜒 =711.009, d.f.=155), CFI of .807, and SRMR of .0649. No measurement
variables were dropped after the initial CFA on subset model 2 because there were none that had
standardized loadings of less than .5 on their respective factors. Table 15 lists the CFA
measurement variables and their related constructs.
Table 15: Awareness Related Factors and their Associated Measurement Variables

Construct
Perceived
Awareness of
Immediate
Threat
Environment
Perceived
Awareness of
Vulnerabilities
in the Physical
Infrastructure
Perceived
Awareness of
Defensive
Measures in
Place
Perceived
Readiness to
Detect Attacks

Drop

Item
Standardized
Number Regression
Weight
PA1.1
.853
PA1.2
.831
PA2.1
.872
PA2.2
.799

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent
Attacks

Perceived
Readiness to
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PA1.3
PA1.4
PA2.3
PA2.4

.751
.820
.840
.846

PA1.5

.829

PA2.5

.836

PR1.1

.797

PR1.2

.882

PR2.1

.872

PR1.3

.901

PR1.4

.856

PR2.2

.799

PR2.3

.818

PR1.5

.802

Recover from
Attacks

PR2.4

.894

PR2.5

.891

4.13 Subset Model 3: User Community Awareness Factor
The final subset model that was tested was Degree of User Community Awareness of
Security Issues. As was the case with the previous sub-models, the three perceived readiness
factors were included in the analysis. The resulting CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f. ratio of 3.405
(𝜒 =333.653, d.f.=98), a CFI of .867, and an SRMR of .0761. No measurement variables were
dropped after the initial CFA on subset model 3 because there were none that had standardized
loadings of less than .5 on their respective factors. Table 16 lists the CFA measurement
variables and their related constructs.
Table 16: User Community Awareness of Security Issues Factor and Associated Measurement Variables

Construct
Degree of User
Community
Awareness of
Security Issues

Perceived
Readiness to
Detect Attacks

Drop

Item
Standardized
Number Regression
Weight
ED1.1
.774
ED1.2
.687
ED1.3
.835
ED1.4
.844
ED1.5
.609
ED1.6
.745
PR1.1
.808

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent
Attacks
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PR1.2

.876

PR2.1

.871

PR1.3

.890

PR1.4

.850

PR2.2

.815

Perceived
Readiness to
Recover from
Attacks

PR2.3

.823

PR1.5

.818

PR2.4

.881

PR2.5

.888

4.14 Methodology Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the methodology that was undertaken to validate the
PACRM survey instrument. Over the course of approximately nine months, three distinct stages
of instrument validation stages took place. The first two stages comprised the pilot test phase in
which both qualitative interviews and a pilot study were conducted on the proposed PACRM
survey. This phase helped to establish the content validity of the survey instrument. In addition,
reliability statistics were generated on the initial pilot test data (n=25) gathered from IT
administrators working at 4-year public colleges and universities in the southeastern United
States. These reliability statistics showed that several of the survey items needed to be reworked
in subsequent drafts of the PACRM survey.
Stage 3 of the instrument validation process consisted of a larger study of 161 workgroup IT
managers at colleges and universities across the United States. The construct validity of the
survey items was aided by another round of reliability testing in which all of the PACRM
constructs were found to have good reliability, as denoted by Cronbach’s alphas of .70 or above.
Futhermore, Confirmatory Factor Analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS Amos software,
version 25. The original PACRM measurement model, outlined in Table 5 of this dissertation,
was divided into three, theory-related submodels, each specifying a different group of factors
from within the larger PACRM measurement model. These analyses resulted in several of the
measurement variables being dropped due to low factor loadings. In addition, Extent of Use of
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Preventative Software Measures was found to actually be a confounding of two, distinct latent
variables. It was partitioned out accordingly and each of the associated measurement variables
were found to load highly on their respective factors. Admittedly, the fit indices for each of the
sub-models are not great, although they are close to the traditional accepted boundaries. This is,
in some ways, to be expected as the individual sub-models by no means represent the most
parsimonious or complete solutions.
In the next chapter, the three submodels were recombined into a new, more parsimonious
full measurement model. A new Confirmatory Factor Analysis was then performed on the full
model and the constructs were examined for evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.
Finally, the path analysis was conducted in IBM SPSS Amos using the participants’ averaged
scores from the measurement variables to represent the latent constructs.
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5

5.1

RESULTS

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Full Measurement Model Results
In order to ensure a good parameter estimate to observation ratio (Vorhies & Morgan, 2005),

the full PACRM measurement model was divided into three subsets of theoretically related
submodels (Bentler & Chou, 1987). Due to the low number of observations relative to the
complexity of the overall model, this was done in the model trimming stage so that measurement
variables that did not load well on their respective factors could more easily be identified. In this
way, five measurement variables were dropped from further analysis due to loadings that were
below the .5 threshold on their respective factors. In addition, Extent of Use of Preventative
Software Measures was divided into two distinct latent factors. The first, Extent of Use of
Preventative Software Measures, contains three measurement variables while the second,
Frequency of Use of Preventative Measures, contains six measurement variables.
As the next step in the CFA process, the three submodels were recombined into a full
measurement model and a new CFA was performed using the stage 3 dataset of 135
observations. The CFA had a Chi-Square to d.f. ratio of 2.274 (𝜒 =2575.918, d.f.=1133), a
Comparative Fit Index of .778, an RMSEA value of .097, and a Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual value of .0782. None of these values represent a good model fit although the ChiSquare to d.f. ratio and SRMR values are within traditional boundaries for acceptable model fit
for those statistics (Marsh et al., 2004; Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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5.2

Convergent/Discriminant Validity of Full Measurement Model Results
Convergent validity is the agreement between measures of the same construct while

discriminant validity is the distinctiveness between different constructs (Campbell & Fiske,
1959). Table 17 lists the validity and reliability statistics for all of the constructs in the full
measurement model.
Table 17: Validity and Reliability Statistics for the Full Measurement Model Constructs

CR
UsrCommA
PrevExpe
NwActMon
PhysCtrl
PrvSWMea
FrPrvMea
RgOffBck
PRDetect
PRPrevnt
PRRecovr
RskAvoid
AwarThrt
AwarVuln
AwarDefM

0.886
0.750
0.931
0.867
0.861
0.918
0.854
0.888
0.908
0.898
0.741
0.906
0.888
0.819

AVE
0.568
0.604
0.694
0.687
0.676
0.658
0.749
0.727
0.712
0.746
0.492
0.707
0.664
0.694

MSV
0.183
0.291
0.432
0.473
0.265
0.567
0.567
0.880
0.880
0.740
0.250
0.876
0.996
0.996

MaxR(H)
0.899
0.801
0.950
0.885
0.902
0.947
0.964
0.895
0.917
0.905
0.772
0.911
0.891
0.820

As seen by the Composite Reliability (CR) column, all of the constructs show good overall
reliability. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE), which measures the average amount of
variance in the measurement variables explained by their respective constructs, is an indication
of convergent validity. As can be seen in Table 17, the AVE for each of the factors except
Personal Risk Avoidance are above the .5 treshold. This indicates that the constructs in the
PACRM measurement model were generally successful in accounting for more than half of the
observed variance in the measurement variables. The low AVE value for the Personal Risk
Avoidance factor is the one exception to this pattern. However, given the fact that this construct
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shows both good reliability and discriminant validity, it is not overally problematic for the
analysis.
Of greater concern is the fact that Perceived Readiness to Detect an Attack and Perceived
Readiness to Prevent an Attack show a degree of discriminant validity violations with one
another. This can be seen in Table 17 by the fact that the AVE is less than the Maximum Shared
Variance (MSV) for each of these factors. This indicates that there is some correlation between
the two constructs. This also seems to be the case with the three awareness-related factors. All
three constructs, Perceived Awareness of the Immediate Threat Environment, Perceived
Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure, and Perceived Awareness of
Defensive Measures seem to be highly correlated with one another. These correlations are
readily apparent in the Factor Correlation Matrix, shown in Table 18 below.
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Table 18: Factor Correlation Table
Usr
Com
mA
Usr
Com
mA
Prev
Expe
NwA
ctMo
n
Phys
Ctrl
PrvS
WM
ea
FrPr
vMe
a
RgO
ffBc
k
PRD
etect
PRP
revn
t
PRR
ecov
r
Rsk
Avoi
d
Awa
rThr
t
Awa
rVul
n
Awa
rDef
M

Prev
Expe

NwA
ctMo
n

Phys
Ctrl

PrvS
WM
ea

FrPr
vMe
a

RgO
ffBc
k

PRD
etect

PRP
revn
t

PRR
ecov
r

Rsk
Avoi
d

Awa
rThr
t

Awa
rVul
n

Awa
rDef
M

0.754
0.066

0.777

0.096

0.536

0.833

0.189

0.442

0.569

0.829

0.177

0.166

0.249

0.451

0.822

0.160

0.415

0.657

0.688

0.515

0.811

0.073

0.405

0.618

0.687

0.438

0.753

0.866

0.366

0.420

0.623

0.661

0.499

0.566

0.491

0.852

0.428

0.472

0.582

0.598

0.418

0.542

0.452

0.938

0.844

0.353

0.483

0.512

0.646

0.437

0.516

0.500

0.843

0.860

0.864

0.068

0.500

0.231

0.096

0.024

0.271

0.161

0.181

0.095

0.124

0.701

0.352

0.539

0.598

0.606

0.296

0.481

0.479

0.708

0.708

0.584

0.092

0.841

0.394

0.498

0.600

0.667

0.378

0.546

0.501

0.840

0.782

0.739

0.063

0.936

0.815

0.305

0.438

0.606

0.608

0.407

0.568

0.541

0.868

0.769

0.718

0.032

0.901

0.998

82

0.833

In order to determine the source of the factor correlation, the factor score weights for each of
the constructs were examined. Upon closer inspection, it was found that there was significant
cross-loading between Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the Physical Infrastructure and
Perceived Awareness of Defensive Measures, such that all of their measurement variables loaded
highly on both constructs.
Table 19: Factor Loadings for Three Perceived Awareness Constructs

Item Number

Expected
Factor

Actual
Factor

Perceived
Perceived
Awareness
Awareness of
of Defensive Vulnerabilities
Measures in the Physical
Infrastructure

PA1.1
PA1.2
PA1.3

AwarThrt
AwarThrt
AwarVuln

AwarThrt
AwarThrt
AwarVuln

.066
.059
.053

.075
.067
.079

Perceived
Awareness
of the
Immediate
Threat
Environment
.202
.182
.044

PA1.4
PA1.5
PA2.1
PA2.2
PA2.3
PA2.4
PA2.5

AwarVuln
AwarDefM
AwarThrt
AwarThrt
AwarVuln
AwarVuln
AwarDefM

AwarVuln
AwarDefM
AwarThrt
AwarThrt
AwarVuln
AwarVuln
AwarDefM

.072
.106
.055
.037
.091
.091
.134

.108
.077
.063
.042
.136
.136
.099

.060
.051
.169
.113
.075
.075
.065

This result was not theorized and so it is difficult to discern exactly what second-order factor
is causing the cross-loadings between these two factors. An educated guess can be made that the
four measurement variables, which attempted to assess the IT manager’s knowledge and
awareness of his or her organizational unit’s network physical design and vulnerability to attack,
were actually read by participants as indicators of their preparedness for a cyberattack.
Similarly, the two survey items that questioned the IT managers on their knowledge and
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awareness of any defensive measures that were in place to protect their networks may also have
been read by study participants as indicators of their preparedness.
The factor loadings also show that the high correlation between Perceived Readiness to
Detect Attacks and Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks were caused by items cross-loading
between these two factors, although not to the degree seen in the perceived awareness constructs.
Table 20 has the factor loadings for the three perceived readiness constructs, along with their
measurement variables.
Table 20: Factor Loadings for Three Perceived Readiness Constructs

Item Number

Expected
Factor

Actual
Factor

Perceived
Readiness
to Recover
from an
Attack

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent
Attacks

Perceived
Readiness to
Detect
Attacks

PR1.1
PR1.2
PR1.3

PRDetect
PRDetect
PRPrevnt

PRDetect
PRDetect
PRPrevnt

.014
.023
.063

.058
.095
.241

.084
.136
.111

PR1.4
PR1.5
PR2.1
PR2.2
PR2.3
PR2.4
PR2.5

PRPrevnt
PRRecovr
PRDetect
PRPrevnt
PRPrevnt
PRRecovr
PRRecovr

PRPrevnt
PRRecovr
PRDetect
PRPrevnt
PRPrevnt
PRRecovr
PRRecovr

.038
.137
.020
.028
.029
.277
.263

.147
.025
.084
.106
.110
.051
.049

.067
.011
.121
.048
.050
.021
.020

The measurement variables all loaded on their expected factors. However, the items
pertaining to the IT manager’s perceived ability to detect if his or her computer resources were
being used in support of illicit activities and the item related to his or her readiness to detect if a
computer resource had been hacked, both loaded highly on Perceived Readiness to Detect
Attacks and Perceived Readiness to Prevent Attacks. It may be that the specificity of these two
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questions triggered a prevention response in the minds of the IT administrators, in addition to the
detect response that was theorized.
Table 21 lists the complete set of measurement variables that were used in the final
measurement model, together with their respective regression weights.
Table 21: Full Measurement Model Constructs with Their Associated Measurement Variables

Construct

Item
Number

Item
Description

Level of
Previous
Experience
with
Cybersecurity

PE4.1

Personal Risk
Avoidance
Score

D8.1

Indicate your level of previous
experience with each of the following
items: Preventing or stopping
cyberattacks?
Indicate your level of previous
experience with each of the following
items: Initiating cyberattacks? (Either
as part of an advanced cybersecurity
certification training program, or as a
Certified Ethical Hacker, or on your
own)
Indicate your level of agreement to
each of the following items: In
general, I try to avoid risk whenever
possible at work.
Indicate your level of agreement to
each of the following items: I am not
comfortable accepting risk in matters
related to my job.
Indicate your level of agreement to
each of the following items: I am not
comfortable accepting risk when it
comes to the information security of
my department.
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Network
activity logging mechanisms to
monitor network activity?
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) and/or

PE4.2

D8.2

D8.3

Extent of Use of
Network
Activity
Monitoring
Mechanisms
Extent of Use of
Network
Activity
Monitoring

EU1.1

EU1.2
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Standardized
Regression
Weight
.874

.666

.606

.818

.663

.749

.791

Mechanisms
(cont.)

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) on
your network?
EU1.3

EU2.1

EU2.2

EU2.3

Extent of
Control over
Physical
Access to
Network
Resources

EU1.4

EU1.5

Extent of
Control over
Physical
Access to
Network
Resources
(cont.)

EU2.4

Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Sensor
deployments and/or traffic analyzers
for your network?
Indicate the frequency for which each
of following items is true for the
technology in your unit: You monitor
general network activity logs for signs
of suspicious network activity?
Indicate the frequency for which each
of following items is true for the
technology in your unit: You check
the probing and/or block reports from
any Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
and/or Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IPS) on your network?
Indicate the frequency for which each
of following items is true for the
technology in your unit: You analyze
reports or data from a sensor
deployment (e.g., honeypots, traffic
analyzers other than your IDS/IPS,
etc.) for your network?
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Physical
controls to prevent unauthorized
physical access to network and server
resources?
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Locked
rooms and/or server cabinets to secure
servers or other vital computer
resources?
Indicate the frequency for which each
of following items is true for the
technology in your unit: You control
unauthorized access to server and
network resources?
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.742

.904

.941

.852

.894

.853

.731

Extent of Use of
Preventative
Software
Measures

EU1.10

EU1.11

EU1.12

Frequency of
Use of
Preventative
Measures

EU2.5

EU2.6

EU2.7

Frequency of
Use of
Preventative
Measures
(cont.)

EU2.8

EU2.9

EU2.10

Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Computers
that are protected with antivirus
software?
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Computers
that are protected with anti-malware
software?
Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Computers
that are protected by one or more
firewalls?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You require
authorized users to change their
passwords?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You update
antivirus definitions for the computers
in your school or department?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You update
the anti-malware settings to reflect
current or emerging threats?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You update
the firewall settings to reflect current
or emerging threats?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You update
the firewall setting to allow approved
applications to access the network?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You run
critical software and operating system
updates on computers?
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.930

.765

.763

.516

.917

.925

.875

.809

.750

Extent of Use of
a Backup
Policy Where
Backups are
Kept Offline

EU1.13

EU2.11

Degree of User
Community
Awareness of
Security Issues

ED1.1

Degree of User
Community
Awareness of
Security Issues
(cont.)

ED1.2

ED1.3

ED1.4

Indicate the extent to which you use
each of the following items for the
technology in your unit: Regular
backups of servers or other vital
computer resources that are then kept
offline?
Please indicate the frequency for
which each of following is true for the
equipment in your unit: You back up
servers or vital computer resources
according to a backup policy that
requires offline storage of backups?
Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to update their
work computer's operating system
and/or applications whenever a new
update becomes available?
Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to update their
antivirus definitions whenever a new
update becomes available?
Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to exercise caution
when using USB drives or external
hard drives, which they have
previously used outside the
workplace, on a school or department
computer?
Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to exercise caution
when downloading or installing
software or apps from untrusted
sources onto their work computers?

88

.731

.983

.783

.693

.833

.839

ED1.5

Degree of User
Community
Awareness of
Security Issues
(cont.)

ED1.6

Perceived
Awareness of
the Immediate
Threat
Environment

PA1.1

PA1.2

PA2.1

PA2.2

Perceived
Awareness of
Vulnerabilities
in the Physical
Infrastructure

PA1.3

PA1.4

Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to exercise caution
when engaging in conversations that
could divulge sensitive information to
unauthorized personnel, such as is
common in social-engineering type
situations?
Please indicate the extent to which
you feel that the user community you
support is educated about the
following topics related to information
security: The need to exercise caution
when opening email attachments and
clickable links in email?
How do you rate your level of
knowledge for each of the following
for the equipment in your school or
department: The volume and type of
network traffic that takes place on
your network?
How do you rate your level of
knowledge for each of the following
for the equipment in your school or
department: The nature and type of
network traffic on any networks that
connect with yours?
Rate your level of awareness for each
of the following items regarding the
technology in your unit: The type of
network traffic on your department
network?
Rate your level of awareness for each
of the following items regarding the
technology in your unit: The type of
network traffic on your department
network?
Rate your level of knowledge for each
of the following items for the
technology in your unit: The
vulnerability of your computers and
network equipment to a cyberattack?
Rate your level of knowledge for each
of the following items for the
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.611

.736

.885

.870

.837

.767

.764

.832

technology in your unit: The physical
design and layout of your network?
Perceived
Awareness of
Vulnerabilities
in the Physical
Infrastructure
(cont.)

PA2.3

Perceived
Awareness of
Defensive
Measures in
Place

PA1.5

PA2.4

PA2.5

Perceived
Readiness to
Detect Attacks

PR1.1

PR1.2

PR2.1

Perceived
Readiness to
Prevent
Attacks

PR1.3

Rate your level of awareness for each
of the following items regarding the
technology in your unit: The number
and severity of potential
vulnerabilities on your network?
Rate your level of awareness for each
of the following items regarding the
technology in your unit: The overall
physical infrastructure of your
network?
Rate your level of knowledge for each
of the following items for the
technology in your unit: The type of
defensive measures that are currently
protecting your network?
Rate your level of awareness for each
of the following items regarding the
technology in your unit: The
defensive measures that protect your
network?
Rate your ability in relation to each of
the following items for the technology
in your unit: To detect whether a
computer or network resource has
been compromised by malware?
Rate your ability in relation to each of
the following items for the technology
in your unit: To detect whether a
computer or network resource is being
used in support of an illegal activity
such as a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack?
Rate your readiness to address each of
the following for the equipment in
your school or department: To detect
whether a computer or network
resource has been hacked?
Rate your ability in relation to each of
the following items for the technology
in your unit: The vulnerability of your
computers and network equipment to
a cyberattack?
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.829

.833

.83

.835

.812

.903

.847

.906

PR1.4

PR2.2

PR2.3

Perceived
Readiness to
Recover From
Attacks

PR1.5

PR2.4

PR2.5

5.3

Rate your ability in relation to each of
the following items for the technology
in your unit: The physical design and
layout of your network?
Rate your readiness to address each of
the following for the equipment in
your school or department: To
prevent a ransom ware attack from
limiting users’ ability to access data
resources?
Rate your readiness to address each of
the following for the equipment in
your school or department: To
prevent a ransom ware attack from
encrypting servers or sensitive data
resources such as data that falls under
FERPA or HIPPA regulations?
Rate your ability in relation to each of
the following items for the technology
in your unit: To recover users’ access
to vital computer resources in the
event of a ransom ware attack without
paying the ransom?
Rate your readiness to address each of
the following for the equipment in
your school or department: To
recover data resources after they have
been fully or partially erased by a
computer virus?
Rate your readiness to address each of
the following for the equipment in
your school or department: To
recover data resources after they have
been encrypted by a ransom ware?

.857

.799

.809

.809

.886

.893

Path Model Diagram and Results
After the measurement model was validated, a path analysis that used the participants’

average scores on the measurement variables to represent each factor was conducted. Table 22
lists the mean and standard deviations for all the participants’ scores averaged across factors.
Survey items were coded according to a Likert-type scale. All survey items were corrected prior
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to analysis to correspond with the traditional format of 1 equaling “strongly disagree” and 5
equaling “strongly agree”.
Table 22: Means and Standard Deviations for averaged participants’ scores

Factor Label Factor Description
N
Mean
S.D.
PrevExpe
Previous Experience
135
2.111
.87389
RskAvoid
Risk Avoidance
135
3.6741
.97860
NwActMon
Extent of Use of Network Activity
135
2.6741 1.19751
Monitoring Activities
PhysCtrl
Extent of Use of Physical Control over
135
3.7630 1.22364
Computer and Network Resources
PrvSWMea
Extent of Use of Preventative Software
135
4.4617
.81343
Measures
FrPrvMeas
Frequency of Use of Preventative
135
3.7272 1.22298
Measures
RgOffBck
Extent of Use of Regular Offline
135
3.7889 1.33616
Backups
UsrCommA User Community Awareness of IT
135
3.2679
.90239
Security Issues
AwarThrt
Perceived Awareness of the Immediate
135
3.2926 1.08007
Threat Environment
AwarVuln
Perceived Awareness of Vulnerabilities
135
3.5722 1.03207
in the Physical Infrastructure
AwarDefM
Perceived Awareness of the Defensive
135
3.6704 1.06358
Measures Protecting Computer
Resources
PRDetect
Perceived Readiness to Detect
135
3.6840 1.10202
Cyberattacks
PRPrevnt
Perceived Readiness to Prevent
135
3.3685 1.05264
Cyberattacks
PRRecovr
Perceived Readiness to Recover from a 135
3.5926
1.14291
Cyberattack
Figures 12 and 13 below show the full PACRM path model, first with the hypothesized
relationships (Fig. 12) and then with the results (Fig. 13).
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Figure 12: PACRM Path Model with Hypothesized Relationships
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Figure 13: PACRM Path Model Results
*** denotes significance at the .001 level
** denotes significance at the .01 level
* denotes significance at the .05 level
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Figure 14: PACRM Path Model Results when Risk Avoidance and Interaction Term are Removed
*** denotes significance at the .001 level
** denotes significance at the .01 level
* denotes significance at the .05 level
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Table 23: PACRM Path Model Results with Risk and Interaction Term Included

Hypothesis
#
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13
H14
H15
H16
H17
H18
H19
H20
H21
H22
H23
H24
H25
H26
5.4

Regression Path
Experience  Network Activity Monitoring
Experience  Physical Control
Experience  Prev. Software Measures
Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures
Experience  Regular Offline Backups
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Network Act Mon
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Physical Control
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Prev. Software
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Freq. Prev. Meas.
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Reg. Offline Back.
Risk  Network Activity Monitoring
Risk  Physical Control
Risk  Prev. Software Measures
Risk  Freq. Preventative Measures
Risk  Regular Offline Backups
Network Act. Mon.  Readiness to Detect
Physical Control  Readiness to Prevent
Prev. Soft. Mea.  Readiness to Prevent
Freq. Prev. Meas.  Readiness to Prevent
Reg. Offline Back  Readiness to Recover
Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Detect
Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Prevent
Awar. Vulnerabilities  Readiness to Prev.
Awar. Defensive Mea.  Readiness to Prv.
Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Detect
Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Prevnt.

Param.
Value
.551
.323
.277
.233
.463
.020
.083
-.028
.074
.023
-.083
-.025
.156
-.250
.062
.318
.042
.119
.078
.344
.379
.022
.280
.216
.219
.238

S.E. Critical
Value
.352 1.565
.372
.869
.265 1.046
.375
.622
.418 1.106
.098
.199
.104
.794
.074
-.376
.105
.705
.117
.193
.244
-.340
.258
-.095
.184
.847
.261
-.958
.291
.212
.064 4.941
.052
.811
.073 1.637
.051 1.509
.065 5.305
.063 5.991
.105
.208
.130 2.151
.106 2.042
.076 2.899
.065 3.677

P
.118
.385
.296
.534
.269
.842
.427
.707
.481
.847
.734
.924
.397
.338
.832
<.001
.417
.102
.131
<.001
<.001
.835
.031
.041
.004
<.001

Discussion
Table 24 lists the hypotheses and whether they were supported by the results of the path

analysis.
Table 24: List of Hypotheses and whether they were supported with Risk and Interaction Term Included

Hypothesis
#
H1
H2
H3
H4

Regression Path

Supported

Experience  Network Activity Monitoring
Experience  Physical Control
Experience  Prev. Software Measures
Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures

NO
NO
NO
NO
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H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13
H14
H15
H16
H17
H18
H19
H20
H21
H22
H23
H24
H25
H26

Experience  Regular Offline Backups
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Network Act Mon
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Physical Control
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Prev. Software
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Freq. Prev. Meas.
Risk/Exp. Interaction  Reg. Offline Back.
Risk  Network Activity Monitoring
Risk  Physical Control
Risk  Prev. Software Measures
Risk  Freq. Preventative Measures
Risk  Regular Offline Backups
Network Act. Mon.  Readiness to Detect
Physical Control  Readiness to Prevent
Prev. Soft. Mea.  Readiness to Prevent
Freq. Prev. Meas.  Readiness to Prevent
Reg. Offline Back  Readiness to Recover
Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Detect
Awar. Immed. Thrt  Readiness to Prevent
Awar. Vulnerabilities  Readiness to Prev.
Awar. Defensive Mea.  Readiness to Prv.
Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Detect
Usr. Comm. Aware.  Readiness to Prevnt.

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES

As can be seen in Table 24, when the interaction of risk avoidance and level of previous
experience with cybersecurity is included in the model, only 7 of the 26 hypothesized
relationships ended up being significant at some level at or below the .05 threshold. However, as
can be seen in Figure 14, when the risk factor and the associated interaction term are removed
from the model, as supported by its relatively low average variance explained value from Table
17 as well as by the fact that it does not significantly contribute the model, an IT manager’s level
of previous experience with cybersecurity comes back into play. The beta and p values for the
first five hypotheses, when risk is not included in the model, are listed below in Table 25.
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Table 25: PACRM Path Model Results for H1‐H5 when Risk and the Interaction Term are Removed

Hypothesis
#
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

Regression Path
Experience  Network Activity Monitoring
Experience  Physical Control
Experience  Prev. Software Measures
Experience  Freq. Preventative Measures
Experience  Regular Offline Backups

Param.
Value
.634
.531
.142
.520
.490

S.E. Critical
Value
.105 6.042
.112 4.749
.079 1.792
.112 4.629
.125 3.918

P
<.001
<.001
.073
<.001
<.001

There is, therefore, evidence to suggest relationships between an IT manager’s level of
previous cybersecurity experience and the extent of his or her use of network activity monitoring
behaviors (H1, p < .001), the degree to which he or she exercises physical control over computer
resources (H2, p < .001), the frequency with which he or she updates preventative measures such
as passwords, firewalls, or anti-malware software (H4, p <.001), and the periodic use of regular
offline backups (H5, p < .001). While the IT manager’s level of previous experience does seem
to influence the frequency with which he or she updates preventative measures such as adjusting
the settings on firewalls, anti-virus, or anti-malware software, it does not seem to affect the
extent to which he or she uses these preventative software measures (H3, p =.073). This
suggests that either the use of preventative software measures is ubiquitous across most of the IT
managers surveyed, regardless of level of experience, or that the use of preventative software
measures occurs only on a limited number of computer and network resources, but that the more
experienced IT managers keep those settings updated on a regular basis.
The use of network activity monitoring devices and the frequency with which IT managers
examine logs looking for signs of suspicious activity did prove to be a strong determinant of their
perceived readiness to detect cyberattacks (H16, p < .001). This is an important consideration.
One significant area of concern in organizational cybersecurity is in creating opportunities for IT
administrators to regularly go through their network activity logs looking for signs of suspicious
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network activity. Most administrators are far too busy or disinterested to regularly peruse
network log data. As this research demonstrates, however, the dividends in terms of an increased
perception of readiness to detect a cyberattack are clear. Similarly, the periodic use of offline
backups was a clear determinant in administrators’ perceived readiness to recover from a
cyberattack (H20, p < .001).
The IT manager’s perceived awareness of the immediate threat environment, which was
operationalized as his or her knowledge and awareness of the type of network traffic that is
flowing through the organizational unit’s computer networks and any intersecting computer
networks, was also a strong indicator of his or her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack
(H21, p < .001). However, the assurances provided by such knowledge did not extend to an
increased perceptual readiness to prevent a cyberattack (H22, p = .835). This suggests that
detection and prevention of cyberattacks are indeed two very distinct subsets of cybersecurity
and network administrative skills and that while some IT administrators may feel well versed in
the detection of suspicious activity, they do not necessarily feel as though they can prevent
cyberattacks. It is important to be realistic, therefore, about the fact that, considering zero-day
exploits and other non-detectable threats, prevention of cyberattacks is a very different animal
than is detection.
Awareness of vulnerabilities in the physical infrastructure and awareness of defensive
measures were statistically significant determinants of a perceived readiness to prevent a
cyberattack (H23 & H24, p < .05). Recall from the discussion on discriminant validity earlier in
this chapter that these two factors were highly correlated with one another. It may be that some
second-order latent factor such as preparedness is driving the responses on the survey items.
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Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that these variables would act upon perceived readiness to
prevent a cyberattack in a similar manner.
What is particularly interesting about this research is the apparent effect that the degree to
which the user community is educated on IT security issues affects the administrator’s perceived
readiness to detect (H25, p < .01) and prevent (H26, p < .001) cyberattacks. This is a hallmark
of complex, multi-tiered, decentralized organizations. Since workgroup IT managers who work
at the organizational-unit level of such institutions are often doing so in support of a small user
community, this research highlights the importance of training programs to educate those users
on adhering to safe computer behaviors in the workplace. Such behaviors may include not using
USB drives in personal and work computers or being wary of situations in which phishing or
social engineering attempts are likely to occur.
One way to conceptualize the scope of this finding is that smaller organizations, such as
entrepreneurships operate in very similar ways as do individual departments within larger
organizations do. A start-up business might, for example, have only one or two IT
administrators who struggle with safeguarding the computer resources of the business while
managing excessive demands on their time and resources. Often that person may not even have
a background in IT management. By highlighting the apparent effectiveness of educating the
user community on issues related to IT security, this research supports a way to increase the
cybersecurity profile for such organizations. It should be clear, in fact, from the recent, high
profile cyber and ransom ware attacks that have taken place that cybersecurity is an issue that
affects everyone. To be sure, many behaviors, such as using network activity logging
mechanisms like Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems and sensors, as well as regularly
monitoring the log data from those devices, rest squarely on the shoulders of the IT
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administrator. Similarly, the periodic use of offline backups of important organizational unit
data is a task that is best suited for the individual IT administrator. However, gone are the
halcyon days where employees, executives, students, educators, and administrators could breathe
an inward sigh of relief every time they read about a cyberattack and think to themselves, “I’m
glad that I don’t have to deal with that.” As this research plausibly demonstrates, the behavior of
the user community on issues related to IT security can positively or adversely affect IT
administrators’ level of comfort in their ability to detect and prevent cyberattacks. This is an
especially important consideration in decentralized institutions such as colleges and universities
where the local workgroup IT manager may be the sole individual responsible for securing the
organizational unit’s data resources.
Finally, the results from the path analysis show that only one of the direct effects between
the IT administrator’s level of previous cybersecurity experience and the three response variables
was significant. The relationship between the IT administrator’s previous cybersecurity
experience and his or her perceived readiness to recover from a cyberattack was significant (p <
.001). Similarly, previous experience in cybersecurity was a strong determinant of an IT
administrator’s extent of use of regular, offline backups (H5, p < .001), which in turn was a
strong determinant of his or her perceived readiness to recover from a cyberattack (H20, p <
.001). The fact that the direct effect was significant suggests that the relationship between an IT
administrator’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived level of
readiness to recover from a cyberattack is only partially mediated by the extent of his or her use
of regular, offline backups.
In this case, the IT administrator’s level of experience may be driving his or her perceived
readiness to recover from a cyberattack, above the effect provided by the extent of his or her use
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of regular, offline backups. This is not unreasonable since the measures related to the IT
manager’s behavior regarding backing up critical data were explicitly directed towards those
behaviors that involved offline backups. However, IT administrators routinely keep numerous
backups of critical data and only a very few (or one) of them may be kept offline. These
additional backups would then, reasonably, be a determinant in the administrator’s perceived
readiness to recover from a cyberattack.
There was, however, a lack of a statistically significant direct effect between the IT
manager’s level of previous cybersecurity experience and his or her perceived readiness to detect
a cyberattack, even though both indirect effects were significant (H1 & H16, p < .001).
According to Barron & Kenny (1986), this indicates that the extent of an IT administrator’s use
of network activity monitoring devices fully mediates the relationship between his or her level of
previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect a cyberattack.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the relationship between the IT administrator’s level
of previous experience with cybersecurity and his or her perceived readiness to detect a
cyberattack is fully mediated by his or her use of network activity monitoring devices. As was
commented upon in the literature review of this dissertation, detection of extant cybersecurity
threats remains one of the most challenging aspects of cybersecurity to this day. The use of
network activity monitoring devices such as traffic analyzers and sensor deployments greatly aid
in the discovery process. One would not expect to see a high level of perceived readiness to
detect cyberattacks, at any level in the organization, without the routine use of such devices.
5.5

Concluding Remarks
This research was originally undertaken to shine a light, however dim, on the darkened

corner of information security research that is the higher education sector. Vast numbers of
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workgroup IT managers at colleges and universities across the United States are responsible for
safeguarding large territories of sensitive computer and data resources. Student admissions data
or staff and faculty health data are examples that readily spring to mind. However, the work of
such administrators, particularly with respect to cybersecurity, often seems to go unnoticed.
Since such administrators may or may not report directly to the centralized IT department, their
cybersecurity preparedness may all too often be overlooked when looking at the cybersecurity
profile of the organization. To make matters worse, only a very small slice of the information
security research that has taken place in recent years has looked at the higher education sector. It
is heartening to note that, in the year and a half that this research has taken, more studies relating
to information security in higher education have begun to emerge (Kobezak et al., 2018; Khouja
et al., 2018). This is a good thing.
Since institutions of higher learning are among the most decentralized and open institutions
in our society, understanding how information security can be improved upon in these settings
informs us all. How should organizational cybersecurity look when there is little opportunity for
rigid controls and punitive deterrents to enforce proper behaviors? In all decentralized
organizations, of which colleges and universities are merely one example, it is imperative that we
empower the human resources in the individual departments to engage in workplace behaviors,
which this and other research studies have affirmed aid in the ability of workgroup IT managers
to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, recover from a cyberattack.
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6

6.1

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Summary of Results
To summarize, this study examined the effects that factors related to workgroup IT

managers’ level of previous experience with cybersecurity, their attitudes towards risk
avoidance, the extent of their use of networking and cybersecurity best practices, their awareness
of several aspects of their computing and network environments, and the extent to which their
user communities were educated about topics related to IT security, have on their perceived
readiness to detect, prevent, and recover from a cyberattack. A new instrument, the Practice and
Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model (PACRM) survey, was proposed and validated. As
part of the instrument validation process, three distinct stages of research were conducted.
Stages 1 and 2 comprised the pilot test or pre-test phase while stage 3 made up the roll-out phase.
Stage 1 consisted of qualitative interviews with a handful of IT administrators working at the
decentralized, department level of a large, public university in the southeastern United States. It
also consisted of a “think-aloud” protocol while the administrators took a paper-based version of
the initial PACRM survey. Stage 2 consisted of a pilot test whereby the PACRM survey was
administered to several IT administrators at colleges and universities throughout the southeastern
United States. Taken together, stages 1 and 2 helped to establish of the content validity of the
PACRM instrument.
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Stage 3 consisted of a national survey of 161 IT administrators working at colleges and
universities throughout the United States. Reliability statistics showed good reliability for all
thirteen of the proposed factors. Additionally, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the
refined PACRM measurement model showed a fair model fit. Lastly, a path analysis, which used
participants’ averaged scores on the measurement variables to represent each factor, showed that
11 of the 21 hypotheses were supported (See Tables 23 & 24).
6.2

The Motivation for the Project
As alluded to above, this project was initially undertaken to combat the relative paucity of

information security research, which relates to the higher education sector. Since the principal
researcher spent a time as a workgroup IT manager at several institutions of higher learning
throughout the United States, this research was also undoubtedly a catharsis. Above all, it was a
way to answer the question that had been bouncing around the researcher’s mind for years, what
are administrators in colleges and universities doing in terms of cybersecurity? It was a question
that needed to be answered. Over the course of the year and a half that it took to take this project
from conception to fruition, however, it has grown into something more. Through speaking and
emailing with IT administrators across the country, hearing their frustrations, witnessing their
overwhelming generosity in overcoming their initial suspicions to help a PhD student complete
his research, a profound appreciation for the work that they do emerged. Although this country
has recently been besieged by incident after incident, the evidence is suggestive that the most
efficient solution, indeed the only cost-effective solution for IT administration at the
decentralized level, is in raising the self-efficacy expectations of the human IT managers at
organizations across the country. As any good MIS textbook will tell you, after all, the most
important component of any information system is the person.
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6.3

Genesis of the Conceptual Model
The primary genesis for the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model came

from the researcher’s own experiences as a workgroup IT manager at several decentralized
institutions of higher learning across the United States. During such work, it was often
frustrating to realize that so much more than was being done in terms of cybersecurity could be
done with only a little more time or a little more budget.
The first step in developing the model came with the awareness that the response variables
in many information security studies often have very little to say about the direct, daily actions of
the actual IT administrator. The first challenge, therefore, in developing the model, lay in the
problem of how to conceive of IT security in a way which relates to the day-to-day actions of the
IT administrator, whether he or she be at the centralized or decentralized level of IT
administration. What does information security look like on the ground, as it were? The clearest
answer to that question was found in the numerous and excellent standards and frameworks for
good IT management, which have been published over the years by regulatory and government
entities. The NIST 2014 high-level functions listed in Table 2 of this dissertation were
particularly helpful in deciding on the response variables of choice depicted in Figures 1 and 6.
Secondly, the independent variables had to be chosen. It was apparent early in the
conceptual design process that the model would focus on the daily practices of IT administrators
as well as on more general aspects of “awareness” of the computing and networking environment
in and around the organizational unit. The specific constructs that would comprise these
amorphous groups had yet to be decided upon, however. Again, the international and national
standards, which the United States federal government and others use to safeguard their data
resources, were immensely helpful. However, also informative in this regard were the
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numerous, high-quality research studies from the Management Information Systems and
Computer Information Systems disciplines. The innumerable research studies on incidents of
computer abuse (only a few of which made their way into this dissertation) from the early
nineties from Detmar Straub and others, which are based in General Deterrence Theory, were
particularly determinative in illuminating one of the many paths that information security
research has taken over the past thirty years. Equally as rewarding, however, were the studies
that look at information security from the vantage point of the Theory of Planned Behavior.
This, of course, led to a realization that what the model had been trying to get at, all along, was
how to define and increase the self-efficacy of workgroup IT managers in terms of cybersecurity.
The fact that the perceived readiness of IT managers to detect, prevent, and recover from a
cyberattack dovetailed so nicely with Bandura’s original conception of efficacy expectations is
what cemented the PACRM model’s place within the Self-Efficacy Theory camp of information
security research.
Lastly, the role of the IT administrator’s level of previous experience with cybersecurity, as
well as the role that his or her attitude towards risk played in the model had to be conceptualized.
From experience and from the literature, it was decided that the IT manager’s level of previous
experience indelibly shaped the extent of his or her use of cybersecurity best practices, which by
this point had crystallized around the use of network activity monitoring devices, control over
physical access to computer resources, the use of preventative software measures, and the use of
offline backups. It was the McHugh et al. article (2000) that led to the conceptualization that the
level of previous experience with cybersecurity construct had to entail the dual perspectives of
both cyberattack and cyber defense. Fred Kaplan’s excellent book entitled, “Dark Territory:
The Secret History of Cyber War,” illustrates that the NSA conceptualizes cybersecurity in a

107

similar way, as comprising elements of both CNA (Computer Network Attack) and CND
(Computer Network Defense), as well as the more nebulous third element of CNE (Computer
Network Exploitation). Meanwhile, it seemed natural that an IT manager’s attitude towards risk
would moderate the relationship between his or her level of previous experience with
cybersecurity and the extent of his or her use of networking and cybersecurity best practices.
The group of “awareness” factors came together much more slowly. It was known from the
beginning of the model development process that these three factors should comprise elements
that were of daily concern to IT administrators. As such, the first factor, Awareness of the
Immediate Threat Environment, seemed fairly straightforward. The numerous articles that
stressed the importance of placing network sensors on both sides of the network periphery as part
of a “Defense in Depth” strategy seemed to confirm this viewpoint. As stated previously, a full
strategy, requiring dozens of strategically placed sensor and traffic analyzers on both sides of the
network border, would seem to be beyond the scope of many decentralized organizational units.
However, a knowledgeable IT administrator, who knows the behaviors and habits of his or her
user community and who frequently examines the data from a single IDS/IPS, will have an
above average idea of what type of network traffic is flowing across the network without
resorting to an expensive, laborious array of sensors.
Once the outward-looking construct was thus conceived, it seemed prudent to look inward at
the physical infrastructure of the computer network and any vulnerabilities that may exist
therein. Once vulnerabilities or other potential areas of weakness were identified, defensive
measures could be deployed. Hence, the second and third awareness constructs were born. It
was thought that by looking outward, towards the threats that IT administrators might face, they
would feel that much more ready to detect potential cyberattacks. By looking inward, however,
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at how the network was laid out and at any potential vulnerabilities as well as the defensive
measures that were in place to safeguard the network, IT administrators might show a greater
readiness to prevent said attacks.
Lastly, the Degree to Which the User Community is Aware of Issues Related to IT Security
came about, as mentioned, through the qualitative interview process. It’s primacy in affecting
both IT administrators’ perceived readiness to detect and prevent cyberattacks speaks to the
efficacy and necessity of the instrument validation process.
6.4

Conclusions about the Conceptual Model
This research, which represents the first iteration of empirical testing for the PACRM model,

showed that the model performed reasonably well despite several aspects of the research that can
be greatly improved upon in future attempts. First, as the initial PACRM measurement model in
Table 5 of this dissertation shows, the survey that was used to test the underlying theoretical
assumptions was not particularly well designed. Some constructs had twelve associated
measurement variables while others had only two. This poor design ultimately proved somewhat
serendipitous by making it clear through the CFA process that the frequency with which the
settings on software preventative measures such as firewalls, antivirus, and anti-malware
software are updated does not equate with the extent of use of such software. A plausible
explanation for this seeming discrepancy is that workgroup IT managers deploy such software on
only a limited set of computer resources (presumably those that hold sensitive data) but that they
update the settings on such software regularly. Furthermore, many of the measurements from the
initial survey were not used in the final measurement model due to low factor loadings. The
refined PACRM measurement model is, therefore, far more parsimonious than was the initial
attempt. Nonetheless, a more well-designed survey should be developed. Doing so should
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greatly improve how the model performs, both in terms of overall model fit and in terms of the
discriminant validity of the proposed constructs.
Furthermore, it was evident from this analysis that the Awareness of Vulnerabilities in the
Physical Infrastructure and Awareness of Defensive Measures were very closely correlated in the
minds of the study’s participants. Again, this might be an instance where cleaning up the
measurement instrument used to test the model could be of enormous benefit.
6.5

Implications for Researchers
Taken as a whole, the Practice and Awareness Cybersecurity Readiness Model represents a

theoretical basis upon which the gauge (and hopefully raise) the self-efficacy expectations of
Workgroup IT managers with respect to their cyber security readiness. It provides a unified set
of constructs that are grounded in the day-to-day practices of IT managers as well as in their
awareness of the computing and networking environments that they oversee. Researchers will
able to test how those daily practices and levels of awareness interact within different settings
and under different conditions. Many of the constructs in the model are fairly specific.
Researchers should therefore welcome the opportunity to pull the constituent parts of the model
apart to test under what conditions they hold true. Even though the testing of this model took
place within a specific context of IT administration, namely at the decentralized level of IT
administration at colleges and universities, it should be equally as applicable to other levels of IT
administration across a variety of organizational contexts.
Lastly, the enumeration of the three response variables in the PACRM model should
hopefully help to guide future information security research towards projects in which the
answers to the questions being asked are rooted in the day-to-day concerns of IT practitioners.
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6.6

Limitations for Conceptual Model Validity
The model was developed using a specific, implicit set of cultural assumptions that are

based in the principal researcher’s many years of personal experience as a workgroup IT
manager working at the decentralized level of IT administration within the United States. It was
also well grounded in national and international frameworks as well as in a rich corpus of
Management Information Systems and Computer Information Systems literature. Nonetheless,
there is no reason to believe that the assumptions, which are intrinsic to the model, will hold true
across every conceivable cultural or situational context. The model may perform very differently
in other settings where, for instance, cyber defense takes on different priorities and meanings. It
cannot immediately be assumed, for example, that the the values of authenticity, confidentiality,
and availability, upon which the three response variables are predicated, will always have the
same meaning.
6.7

Directions for Future Research
The most immediate direction for future research for the PACRM model is to test the

theoretical assumptions across a variety of organizational settings, to see how specifically the
relationships hold up under decentralized and centralized levels of IT administration. Since the
initial empirical testing took place within the higher education sector, it would seem prudent to
test the model in other business and organizational settings including regional offices of multinational firms and national firms, entrepreneurships, non-profits, healthcare, and other
governmental agencies. In addition, expanding the model in terms of some of the assumptions
inherent in the User Community Awareness factor, such as social engineering awareness, would
provide a useful contribution to the literature. Finally, it seems prudent to determine under
which conditions self-efficacy-based models, such as the PACRM model, perform better or
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worse against solutions that are based on other theoretical orientations, such as General
Deterrence Theory.
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APPENDIX A – PACRM QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS – STAGE 1

1. As an Information Technology (IT) manager working at a college or university campus, which
computer and network security best practices do you consider to be the most important for an IT
manager in a similar setting as yours to implement in order to maximize his or her cybersecurity
readiness?

2.

What aspects of network security do you consider to be the most important for an IT manager in a
similar setting as yours to be aware of in order to maximize his or her cybersecurity readiness?
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3. How would you rank the relative importance of an IT manager’s previous level of experience with
cybersecurity training in determining his or her cybersecurity readiness?

4. How would you rank the relative importance of the number and type of an IT manager’s
cybersecurity‐related certifications in determining his or her cybersecurity readiness?

5. How would you rank the relative importance of an IT manager’s attitudes towards risk, both in
general terms and in terms of information security, in affecting his or her perceptions of
cybersecurity readiness?
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6. Please take a few minutes to look over and take the PACRM survey, which follows. Please verbalize
your thoughts regarding the format, structure, ease, and applicability of the survey questions as you
complete the questionnaire. Note that we will not discuss your comments or interact while you are
completing the survey; however, we will discuss these afterwards to help improve the
questionnaire.
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APPENDIX B – INITIAL PACRM SURVEY INSTRUMENT – STAGE 2

Start of Block: Demographic Block
D.1 How old are you?
 19 years or below (1)
 20 - 24 years (2)
 25 - 29 years (3)
 30 - 34 years (4)
 35 - 39 years (5)
 40 - 44 years (6)
 45 - 49 years (7)
 50 - 54 years (8)
 55 - 59 years (9)
 60 - 64 years (10)
 65 - 69 years (11)
 70 years or above (12)

D.2 Are you male or female?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
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D.3 Years of Experience
0-4
(1)
How many
years of
experience
do you have
in the
Information
Technology
(IT) field?
(1)
How many
years of
experience
do you have
working in
IT positions
at colleges
and
universities?
(2)

5-9
(2)

10-14
(3)

15-19
(4)

20-24
(5)

25-29
(6)

30-34
(7)

35-39
(8)

40 or
above
(9)





































D.4 What state is your current school physically located in?
________________________________________________________________

D.5 What is your current job title?
________________________________________________________________
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D.6 Is your direct supervisor a member of the institution's central Information Technology (IT)
department or of an academic unit?
 Central IT Department (1)
 Academic Unit (2)

D.7 Does your work primarily support faculty and staff (Academic Unit) or non-academic
support staff such as the institution's human resources department, physical plant department,
central administration, etc. (Support Unit).
 Academic Unit (1)
 Support Unit (2)
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D.8 Please
indicate your
level of
agreement to
each of the
following
statements:
In general, I
try to avoid
risk
whenever
possible. (1)
I am more
comfortable
accepting risk
in personal
matters than I
am in matters
pertaining to
my work. (2)
I am not
comfortable
accepting risk
when it
comes to the
information
security of
my school or
department.
(3)

Strongly
agree (1)

Somewhat
agree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
disagree (4)

Strongly
disagree (5)































End of Block: Demographic Block
Start of Block: Prior Experience Block
PE.1 Please list any cybersecurity related certifications that you currently hold? If you do not
have any such certifications, please mark 0 below. Common cybersecurity certifications may
include Certified Information Security Auditor (CISA), Certified Information Security Manager
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(CISM), Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical Hacker
(CEH), etc.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

PE.2 Please list any other IT or professional certifications that you currently hold?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

PE.3 How many hours have you spent taking part in cybersecurity training? (Either as part of
formalized training programs or as part of certification preparation)
 0 - 10 hours (1)
 10 - 50 hours (2)
 50 - 200 hours (3)
 200+ hours (4)
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PE.4 Please indicate your level of previous experience with each of the following:
Extensive (1)
Preventing or
stopping
cyberattacks?
(1)
Initiating
cyberattacks?
(Either as part
of an
advanced
cybersecurity
certification
training
program, or
as a Certified
Ethical
Hacker, or on
your own) (2)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)





















End of Block: Prior Experience Block
Start of Block: Extent of Use Block
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EU.1 Please
indicate the
extent to
which you
use each of
the following
in your unit:
Network
activity
logging
mechanisms
to monitor
network
activity? (1)
Intrusion
Detection
Systems
(IDS) and/or
Intrusion
Prevention
Systems
(IPS) on your
network? (2)
A sensor
deployment
and/or traffic
analyzer for
your
network? (3)
Controlling
unauthorized
physical
access to
network and
server
resources? (4)

Extensively
(1)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)
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Servers or
other vital
computer
resources are
secured in a
locked room
and/or server
cabinet? (5)
Computers
that have the
BIOS
locked, or for
which it is
otherwise
impossible to
boot from an
external
device? (6)
Computers
with
encrypted
hard drives?
(7)
Servers or
other vital
computer
resources
with
encrypted
hard drives?
(8)
Requiring
strong
passwords to
prevent
unauthorized
use? (9)
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Computers
that are
protected
with antivirus
software?
(10)
Computers
that are
protected
with antimalware
software?
(11)
Computers
that are
protected by
one or more
firewalls?
(12)
Regular
backups of
servers or
other vital
computer
resources that
are then kept
offline? (13)
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EU.2 Please
indicate the
frequency for
which each of
following is
true for the
equipment in
your unit:
You monitor
general
network
activity logs
for signs of
suspicious
network
activity? (1)
You check
the probing
and/or block
reports from
any Intrusion
Detection
Systems
(IDS) and/or
Intrusion
Prevention
Systems
(IPS) on your
network? (2)

Very
frequently (1)

Frequently
(2)

Periodically
(3)

Seldom (4)

Never (5)
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You analyze
reports or
data from a
sensor
deployment
(e.g.,
honeypots,
traffic
analyzers
other than
your IDS/IPS,
etc.) for your
network? (3)
Unauthorized
visitors have
access to
server and
network
resources? (4)
You require
authorized
users to
change their
passwords?
(5)
You update
antivirus
definitions
for the
computers in
your school
or
department?
(6)
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You update
the antimalware
settings to
reflect current
or emerging
threats? (7)
You update
the firewall
settings to
reflect current
or emerging
threats? (8)
You update
the firewall
setting to
allow
approved
applications
to access the
network? (9)
You run
critical
software and
operating
system
updates on
computers?
(10)
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You back up
servers or
vital
computer
resources
according to a
backup policy
that requires
offline
storage of
backups? (11)







End of Block: Extent of Use Block
Start of Block: Education Block
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ED.1 Please
indicate the
extent to
which you
feel that the
user
community
you support is
educated
about the
following
topics related
to
information
security:
The need to
update their
work
computer's
operating
system and/or
applications
whenever a
new update
becomes
available? (1)
The need to
update their
antivirus
definitions
whenever a
new update
becomes
available? (2)

Extensively
(1)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)
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The need to
exercise
caution when
using USB
drives or
external hard
drives, which
they have
previously
used outside
the
workplace, on
a school or
department
computer? (3)
The need to
exercise
caution when
downloading
or installing
software or
apps from
untrusted
sources onto
their work
computers?
(4)
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The need to
exercise
caution when
engaging in
conversations
that could
divulge
sensitive
information
to
unauthorized
personnel,
such as is
common in
socialengineering
type
situations?
(5)
The need to
exercise
caution when
opening
email
attachments
and clickable
links in
email? (6)





















End of Block: Education Block
Start of Block: Perceived Awareness Block
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PA.1 How
do you rate
your level
of
knowledge
for each of
the
following
for the
equipment
in your
school or
department:
The volume
and type of
network
traffic that
takes place
on your
network?
(1)
The
integrity of
network
traffic on
any
networks
that
intersect
with yours?
(2)

Somewhat
Extremely
Somewhat
Moderately
Not
not
knowledgeabl knowledgeabl knowledgeabl
knowledgeabl
knowledgeabl
e (1)
e (2)
e (3)
e at all (5)
e (4)
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The
infection
rate of the
computers
you support
in terms of
viruses
and/or
malware is
zero? (3)
The
vulnerabilit
y of your
computers
and network
equipment
to a
cyberattack
? (4)
The
physical
infrastructur
e of your
network?
(5)
The type of
defensive
measures
that are
currently
protecting
your
network?
(6)
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PA.2 How do
you rate your
level of
comfort for
each of the
following for
the equipment
in your unit:
None of your
computers or
network
resources are
being used to
support
illegal
activities? (1)
The network
traffic on any
networks that
intersect with
your network
is clean and
secure? (2)
The number
and severity
of potential
vulnerabilities
on your
network are
minimal? (3)
The physical
infrastructure
of your
network is
secure from
being
hacked? (4)

Extremely
comfortable
(1)

Somewhat
comfortable
(2)

Neither
comfortable
Somewhat
Extremely
nor
uncomfortable uncomfortable
uncomfortable
(4)
(5)
(3)
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The defensive
measures that
are currently
protecting
your network
are sufficient
to keep your
system
protected
from a
cyberattack?
(5)







End of Block: Perceived Awareness Block
Start of Block: Perceived Readiness Block
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PR.1 How do
you rate your
ability in
relation to
each of the
following for
the
equipment in
your school
or
department:
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource has
been
compromised
by malware?
(1)
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource is
being used in
support of an
illegal
activity such
as a
Distributed
Denial of
Service
(DDoS)
attack? (2)

Extremely
able (1)

Somewhat
able (2)

Moderately
able (3)

Somewhat
not able (4)

Not able at
all (5)
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To prevent a
cyberattack
from stealing
sensitive
information
from any
computer or
network
resource? (3)
To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
encrypting
servers or
sensitive data
resources? (4)
To recover
users’ access
to vital
computer
resources in
the event of a
ransom ware
attack,
without
paying the
ransom? (5)
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PR.2 How do
you rate your
readiness to
address each
of the
following for
the
equipment in
your school
or
department:
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource has
been hacked?
(1)
To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
limiting
users’ ability
to access data
resources?
(2)

Extremely
ready (1)

Somewhat
ready (2)

Neither ready
nor not ready
(3)

Somewhat
not ready (4)

Not ready at
all (5)
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To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
encrypting
servers or
sensitive data
resources
such as data
that falls
under
FERPA or
HIPAA
regulations?
(3)
To recover
data
resources
after they
have been
fully or
partially
erased by a
computer
virus? (4)
To recover
data
resources
after they
have been
encrypted by
a ransom
ware? (5)































End of Block: Perceived Readiness Block

148

9

APPENDIX C – REVISED PACRM SURVEY INSTRUMENT – STAGE 3

Start of Block: Demographic Block

D.1 How old are you?
 19 years or below (1)
 20 - 24 years (2)
 25 - 29 years (3)
 30 - 34 years (4)
 35 - 39 years (5)
 40 - 44 years (6)
 45 - 49 years (7)
 50 - 54 years (8)
 55 - 59 years (9)
 60 - 64 years (10)
 65 - 69 years (11)
 70 years or above (12)

D.2 Are you male or female?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
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D.3 Years of Experience
0-4
(1)
How many
years of
experience
do you have
in the
Information
Technology
(IT) field?
(1)
How many
years of
experience
do you have
working in
IT positions
at colleges
and
universities?
(2)

5-9
(2)

10-14
(3)

15-19
(4)

20-24
(5)

25-29
(6)

30-34
(7)

35-39
(8)

40 or
above
(9)





































D.4 What state is your current organization physically located in?
________________________________________________________________

D.5 What is your current job title?
________________________________________________________________
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D.6 Is your direct supervisor a member of the institution's central Information Technology (IT)
department or of an academic unit?
 Central IT Department (1)
 Academic Unit (2)

D.7 Does your work primarily support faculty and staff (Academic Unit) or non-academic
support staff such as the institution's human resources department, physical plant department,
central administration, etc. (Support Unit).
 Academic Unit (1)
 Support Unit (2)
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D.8 Indicate
your level of
agreement to
each of the
following
items:
In general, I
try to avoid
risk
whenever
possible at
work. (1)
I am not
comfortable
accepting risk
in matters
related to my
job. (2)
I am not
comfortable
accepting risk
when it
comes to the
information
security of
my
department.
(3)

Strongly
agree (1)

Somewhat
agree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
disagree (4)

Strongly
disagree (5)































End of Block: Demographic Block
Start of Block: Prior Experience Block
PE.1 Please list any cybersecurity related certifications that you currently hold? If you do not
have any such certifications, please mark 0 below. Common cybersecurity certifications may
include Certified Information Security Auditor (CISA), Certified Information Security Manager
(CISM), Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical Hacker
(CEH), etc.
________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

PE.2 Please list any other IT or professional certifications that you currently hold?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

PE.3 How many hours have you spent taking part in cybersecurity training? (Either as part of
formalized training programs or as part of certification preparation)
 0 - 10 hours (1)
 10 - 50 hours (2)
 50 - 200 hours (3)
 200+ hours (4)
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PE.4 Indicate
your level of
previous
experience
with each of
the following
items:
Preventing or
stopping
cyberattacks?
(1)
Initiating
cyberattacks?
(Either as part
of an
advanced
cybersecurity
certification
training
program, or
as a Certified
Ethical
Hacker, or on
your own) (2)

Extensive (1)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)





















End of Block: Prior Experience Block
Start of Block: Extent of Use Block
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EU.1 Indicate
the extent to
which you
use each of
the following
items for the
technology in
your unit:
Network
activity
logging
mechanisms
to monitor
network
activity? (1)
Intrusion
Detection
Systems
(IDS) and/or
Intrusion
Prevention
Systems
(IPS) on your
network? (2)
Sensor
deployments
and/or traffic
analyzers for
your
network? (3)
Physical
controls to
prevent
unauthorized
physical
access to
network and
server
resources? (4)

Extensively
(1)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)
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Locked
rooms and/or
server
cabinets to
secure servers
or other vital
computer
resources? (5)
Computers
with a locked
BIOS or
some other
way to make
the computer
impossible to
boot from an
external
device? (6)
Computers
with
encrypted
hard drives?
(7)
Servers or
other vital
computers
with
encrypted
hard drives?
(8)
Strong
password
requirements
to prevent
unauthorized
user access?
(9)
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Computers
that are
protected
with antivirus
software?
(10)
Computers
that are
protected
with antimalware
software?
(11)
Computers
that are
protected by
one or more
firewalls?
(12)
Regular
backups of
servers or
other vital
computers
that are then
kept offline?
(13)
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EU.2
Indicate the
frequency
for which
each of
following
items is true
for the
technology
in your unit:
You monitor
general
network
activity logs
for signs of
suspicious
network
activity? (1)
You check
the probing
and/or block
reports from
any
Intrusion
Detection
Systems
(IDS) and/or
Intrusion
Prevention
Systems
(IPS) on
your
network? (2)

Very
Frequently Periodically Seldom
frequently
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)

Never
(5)
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You analyze
reports or
data from a
sensor
deployment
(e.g.,
honeypots,
traffic
analyzers
other than
your
IDS/IPS,
etc.) for
your
network? (3)
You control
unauthorized
access to
server and
network
resources?
(4)
You require
authorized
users to
change their
passwords?
(5)
You update
antivirus
definitions
for the
computers in
your school
or
department?
(6)
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You update
the antimalware
settings to
reflect
current or
emerging
threats? (7)
You update
the firewall
settings to
reflect
current or
emerging
threats? (8)
You update
the firewall
setting to
allow
approved
applications
to access the
network? (9)
You run
critical
software and
operating
system
updates on
computers?
(10)
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You back up
servers or
vital
computer
resources
according to
a backup
policy that
requires
offline
storage of
backups?
(11)







End of Block: Extent of Use Block
Start of Block: Education Block
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ED.1 Indicate
the extent to
which you
feel that the
user
community
you support
is educated
about the
following
items related
to
information
security:
The need to
update their
work
computer's
operating
system and/or
applications
whenever a
new update
becomes
available? (1)
The need to
update their
antivirus
definitions
whenever a
new update
becomes
available? (2)

Extensively
(1)

A moderate
amount (3)

A lot (2)

A little (4)

None at all
(5)





















162

The need to
exercise
caution when
using USB
drives or
external hard
drives, which
they have
previously
used outside
the
workplace, on
a work
computer? (3)
The need to
exercise
caution when
downloading
or installing
software or
apps from
third-party
sources onto
their work
computers?
(4)
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The need to
exercise
caution when
engaging in
conversations
that could
divulge
sensitive
information
to
unauthorized
personnel,
such as is
common in
socialengineering
type
situations?
(5)
The need to
exercise
caution when
opening
email
attachments
and clickable
links in
email? (6)





















End of Block: Education Block
Start of Block: Perceived Awareness Block
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PA.1 Rate
your level
of
knowledge
for each of
the
following
items for
the
technology
in your
unit:
The volume
and type of
network
traffic that
takes place
on your
network?
(1)
The nature
and type of
network
traffic on
any
networks
that
connect
with yours?
(2)
The
vulnerabilit
y of your
computers
and
network
equipment
to a
cyberattack
? (3)

Extremely
knowledgeabl
e (1)

Somewhat
knowledgeabl
e (2)

Moderately
knowledgeabl
e (3)

Somewhat
not
knowledgeabl
e (4)

Not
knowledgeabl
e at all (5)
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The
physical
design and
layout of
your
network?
(4)
The type of
defensive
measures
that are
currently
protecting
your
network?
(5)
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PA.2 Rate
your level of
awareness for
each of the
following
items
regarding the
technology in
your unit:
The type of
network
traffic on
your
department
network? (1)
The network
traffic on any
intersecting
networks? (2)
The number
and severity
of potential
vulnerabilities
on your
network? (3)
The overall
physical
infrastructure
of your
network? (4)
The defensive
measures that
protect your
network? (5)

Extremely
aware (1)

Neither
aware nor
unaware (3)

Somewhat
aware (2)

Somewhat
unaware (4)

Extremely
unaware (5)



















































End of Block: Perceived Awareness Block
Start of Block: Perceived Readiness Block
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PR.1 Rate
your ability
in relation to
each of the
following
items for the
technology in
your unit:
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource has
been
compromised
by malware?
(1)
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource is
being used in
support of an
illegal
activity such
as a
Distributed
Denial of
Service
(DDoS)
attack? (2)
To prevent a
cyberattack
from stealing
sensitive
information
from any
computer or
network
resource? (3)

Extremely
able (1)

Somewhat
able (2)

Moderately
able (3)

Somewhat
not able (4)

Not able at
all (5)
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To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
encrypting
servers or
sensitive data
resources? (4)
To recover
users’ access
to vital
computer
resources in
the event of a
ransom ware
attack
without
paying the
ransom? (5)
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PR.2 Rate
your
readiness to
address each
of the
following for
the
equipment in
your school
or
department:
To detect
whether a
computer or
network
resource has
been hacked?
(1)
To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
limiting
users’ ability
to access data
resources?
(2)
To prevent a
ransom ware
attack from
encrypting
servers or
sensitive data
resources
such as data
that falls
under
FERPA or
HIPPA
regulations?
(3)

Extremely
ready (1)

Somewhat
ready (2)

Neither ready
nor not ready
(3)

Somewhat
not ready (4)

Not ready at
all (5)
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To recover
data
resources
after they
have been
fully or
partially
erased by a
computer
virus? (4)
To recover
data
resources
after they
have been
encrypted by
a ransom
ware? (5)





















End of Block: Perceived Readiness Block
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